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examines and weighs the theoretical arguments for and against duality. Based on these arguments, this part
assesses the impact of combined or separate CEO and Chair positions on the board’s performance of its
management and monitoring responsibilities. Part IV turns to the empirical data on the effect of combined,
rather than separate, CEO-Chair roles on corporate performance. Part V explains the views of corporate
stakeholders on the duality debate. The article concludes that theoretical arguments and empirical evidence,
as reflected in financial and nonfinancial metrics, strongly suggest that a corporate governance structure with a
nonexecutive Chair, instead of a dual CEO-Chair, is better suited to the fulfillment of the directors’
fundamental responsibilities to oversee business operations and monitor management for the purpose of
enhancing shareholder value.
Keywords

Corporate law, corporate structure, stakeholders, ceo, board of directors, corporate governance structure
Disciplines

Business Organizations Law

This article is available at Mitchell Hamline Open Access: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/184

To Be or Not to Be Both CEO and
Board Chair
*

Thuy-Nga T. Vo†
The top two leadership roles in the American
corporation are the chief executive officer (“CEO”) and the
chairperson of the board of directors (“Chair”).1 There is a large
body of literature that examines the impact of the CEO’s
compensation and stock ownership on the company’s
performance. Much has also been written about the effects of
the board’s size, director stock ownership, and director
independence on the company’s success. Less attention has
been given to the governance structure in which both the CEO
and Chair positions are held by one individual and the impact
of this dual leadership role—commonly known as “duality”2—on
the corporation’s performance.
Thus far, the limited scholarship on duality takes two
different analytical approaches: the theoretical underpinning of
duality or the empirical effect of duality on discrete
performance variables. Legal scholarship focuses primarily on
theoretical concepts (e.g., conflicts of interests, entrenchment,
and agency costs) to evaluate the different leadership
structures of corporate entities. Literature in the areas of
management, business, and financial economics, by contrast,
*

© 2010 Thuy-Nga T. Vo. All rights reserved.
Harvard Law School, J.D., 1988; University of Minnesota, B.A., summa
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professors Greg Duhl, Doug Heidenreich, and Niels Schaumann for their comments on
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1
See J. Richard Harrison, David L. Torres & Sal Kukalis, The Changing of
the Guard: Turnover and Structural Change in the Top-Management Positions, 33
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 211, 211, 221-23 (1988) (arguing that although the CEO and Chair are
both at the top of the corporate leadership hierarchy, the CEO has greater power
relative to the Chair).
2
See B. Ram Baliga, R. Charles Moyer & Ramesh S. Rao, CEO Duality and
Firm Performance: What’s the Fuss?, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41, 42 (1996) (“In cases of
CEO duality, the CEO of the firm wears two hats—a CEO hat and a chairperson of the
board of directors hat. Nonduality implies that different individuals serve as the CEO
and the chairperson.”).
†
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focuses mostly on results from empirical tests of discrete
measures (e.g., executive compensation, management turnover,
and stock returns) to evaluate the different corporate
leadership structures.
The pervasiveness of duality in corporate America
underlies the importance of understanding this leadership
structure and its impact on corporate performance. This article
analyzes the impact of duality on corporate performance
through an integrated framework, using concepts from legal
scholarship in addition to data from management, business,
and financial literature. Using these theoretical concepts and
empirical results, this article analyzes whether the
combination or separation of the top leadership roles better
supports the foundational concept of corporate governance:
directors are responsible for overseeing business operations
and monitoring management to achieve corporate financial
success.3
Part I of this article discusses the management and
monitoring responsibilities of the board of directors. Part II
explores the duality governance structure and its prevalence in
corporate America. In Part III, the article examines and weighs
the theoretical arguments for and against duality. Based on
these arguments, this part assesses the impact of combined or
separate CEO and Chair positions on the board’s performance
of its management and monitoring responsibilities. Part IV
turns to the empirical data on the effect of combined, rather
than separate, CEO-Chair roles on corporate performance. Part
V explains the views of corporate stakeholders on the duality
3

See AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.01 cmt. a (1994) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. Comment (a) to
section 3.01 quotes the Corporate Director’s Guidebook, which states:
Even under statutes providing that the business and affairs shall be
“managed” by the board of directors, it is recognized that actual operation is a
function of management. The responsibility of the board is limited to
overseeing such operation. . . . It is important to emphasize that the role of
the director is to monitor, in an environment of loyal but independent
oversight, the conduct of the business and affairs of the corporation in behalf
of those who invest in the corporation.
Id.; see also ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 379
(2006) (“One obvious consequence of a person’s agreement to serve as a director is the
understanding that he or she will strive for the corporation’s financial success.”); Paul
Mallette & Karen L. Fowler, Effects of Board Composition and Stock Ownership on the
Adoption of “Poison Pills”, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1010, 1012 (1992) (“[I]t is widely
accepted that boards are the formal representatives of firms’ shareholders and that
they exist to monitor top management performance and protect shareholders’ rights
and interests.”).
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debate. The article concludes that theoretical arguments and
empirical evidence, as reflected in financial and nonfinancial
metrics, strongly suggest that a corporate governance structure
with a nonexecutive Chair, instead of a dual CEO-Chair, is
better suited to the fulfillment of the directors’ fundamental
responsibilities to oversee business operations and monitor
management for the purpose of enhancing shareholder value.
I.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ AUTHORITY TO GOVERN

A.

Management and Monitoring Roles

State statutes provide the board of directors with the
authority to manage and direct the operation of the
corporation.4 The board’s management role requires directors to
set enterprise policies and to make key business decisions
involving matters such as financing plans, growth strategies,
and executive compensation.5 The board’s monitoring role, on
the other hand, entails hiring management personnel to
operate the business and overseeing management to control
weak performances or self-serving action by corporate
managers.6
Both the management and monitoring roles encompass
specific tasks, and it is not always easy or necessary to
determine whether a task is more in the line of managing or
monitoring.7 For example, a board deciding whether to approve

4

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001 & Supp. 2008) (“The business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under
the direction of the board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2008)
(“[T]he business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the
direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . . .”).
5
Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence
Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370, 381 (2002); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate
Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for
Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 279 (2005); R. William Ide, Post-Enron
Corporate Governance Opportunities: Creating a Culture of Greater Board
Collaboration and Oversight, 54 MERCER L. REV. 829, 836 (2003).
6
Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 381; Clark, supra note 5, at 278; Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (1999);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005:
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007); Ide,
supra note 5, at 836, 838; Idalene F. Kesner, Bart Victor & Bruce T. Lamont, Board
Composition and the Commission of Illegal Acts: An Investigation of Fortune 500
Companies, 29 ACAD. MGMT. J. 789, 790 (1986).
7
See Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and
Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 457-62 (2002) (distinguishing the
board’s management function in approving the company’s special purpose vehicles from
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a material transaction with an inside executive is exercising
not only its management role of making a fundamental
business decision, but also its oversight role of ensuring that
the transaction enhances shareholder value instead of merely
furthering executive interests.
There has been vigorous debate over whether the
board’s primary role is to manage or to monitor.8 It is well
settled, though, that a board may delegate its management
authority to corporate officers,9 and that such delegation is now
the norm in corporate America.10 It is the officers who in fact
manage most public corporations on a day-to-day basis.11
Having delegated the daily management function to the
executives, directors retain oversight responsibility in order to

the board’s monitoring function over the CFO’s conflicts of interest in proposing and
operating the special purpose vehicles).
8
See FRANKLIN GEVURTZ, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CORPORATE LAW 68 (2006)
(observing that many commentators believe the board’s primary role is “to monitor
management, rather than . . . manage the corporation”); Bainbridge, supra note 5, at
378 (recounting that the American Law Institute’s first draft of its Principles of
Corporate Governance generated the “hotly debated . . . issue of what role the board of
directors . . . should play in corporate governance”).
9
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a)-(b) (West 2010) (“Every corporation
organized under this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as
shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors which is not
inconsistent with the bylaws . . . . Officers shall be chosen in such manner and shall
hold their offices for such terms as are prescribed by the laws or determined by the
board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40 (2008) (“The board of directors
may elect individuals to fill one or more offices of the corporation . . . .”); id. § 8.41
(“Each officer has the authority and shall perform the functions set forth in the bylaws
or, to the extent consistent with the bylaws, the functions prescribed by the board of
directors . . . .”).
10
See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1278-81 (explaining that the management
role was dominant more than twenty years ago, but the monitoring role has now been
recognized as the primary function of the board); Ide, supra note 5, at 836 (observing
that the monitoring role was less recognized than the management role until postEnron); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 3.02 cmt. d (“In the publicly held corporation,
the management function is normally vested in the principal senior executives.”).
11
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 3.01 cmt. a (quoting the Corporate
Director’s Guidebook, which states, “It is generally recognized that the board of
directors is not expected to operate the business . . . . [I]t is recognized that actual
operation is a function of management. The responsibility of the board is limited to
overseeing such operation.”); id. § 3.02 cmt. d (“A basic function of the board is to select
these executives and to oversee their performance (using the term ‘oversee’ to refer to
general observation and oversight, not active supervision or day-to-day scrutiny) to
determine whether the business is being properly managed . . . .”); Lynn A. Stout, On
the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo
Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 18 (2003) (explaining that after
directors select executives and employees to run daily operations, the directors
intervene in daily operations only on major issues).
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ensure that the executives’ actions advance the company’s
business and financial objectives.12
B.

Independence Requirements

To facilitate the board’s monitoring function, federal
laws and stock exchange listing standards require certain
levels of director independence.13 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 requires public companies to have an audit committee
composed entirely of independent directors.14 Similarly, the
listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange15 and the
Nasdaq Stock Market16 require public companies to have a
12

See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 3.01 cmt. a. Specifically, comment (a)
to section 3.01, quoting the Business Roundtable Statement, states that
Although the board cannot effectively conduct day-to-day operations, the
board does have a major role in, and a major accountability for, the financial
performance of the enterprise. This clearly requires a continuing check on
corporate financial results and prospects, including profit and loss and cash
flow by major business segments.
Id.; see also Stout, supra note 11, at 18 (“Just as a smoke detector may seem an idle
lump of plastic and metal until an actual fire, a board of directors that appears passive
most of the time can save shareholders billions of dollars, if it notices and reacts when
things go wrong.”).
13
See Gordon, supra note 6, at 1477-83 (discussing the evolution of the
director independence rules).
14
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A) (2006). Being
“independent” means the audit committee member may not be an affiliate of the
company and may not receive fees from the company, other than fees for service on the
board or board committees. Id. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B). An “affiliate” of the company is a
person controlling, controlled by, or “under common control with” the company. 17
C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(i) (2010). Having “control” means having the “power to direct
or cause the direction of the management and policies of” the company “through the
ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.” Id. § 240.10A-3(e)(4).
15
N.Y. STOCK EXCH., FINAL NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES 4-10
(2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf. Under NYSE
requirements, a director is not independent if the director receives compensation of
“more than $100,000 per year” from the NYSE company, other than board fees, or if
the director is an executive officer of another company that is doing business with the
NYSE company in excess of the “greater of $1 million or 2% of such other company’s
consolidated gross revenues.” Id. In addition, a director is not considered independent
“unless the board of directors affirmatively determines that the director has no
material relationships with the listed company,” whether in the nature of commercial,
industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable, or familial relationships.
Id. Material relationships may occur directly between the director and the company, or
indirectly through the director being a “partner, shareholder or officer of an
organization that has a relationship with the company.” Id.
16
Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2169, 2187, 2191, 2193 (2004) [hereinafter Developments]. Nasdaq’s standards for
director independence are similar to the NYSE standards discussed above, but
Nasdaq’s cut-off for non-board-related compensation is $60,000 per year, and the cutoff for the director’s business payments to or income from the company is the greater of
$200,000 or “5% of the recipient’s consolidated gross revenues.” Id. at 2189-90.
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majority of independent directors on their boards and to have
the entire nominating, compensation, and audit committees
composed of independent directors.
The director independence requirement is grounded in
the belief that outside directors are more effective than inside
directors in monitoring management conduct.17 Opinions and
research findings, however, are mixed on the value of director
independence.18 There is evidence that director independence
enhances, detracts from, or has no effect on corporate
performance, in both financial and nonfinancial measures.19 For
example, some studies find that outside directors negatively
affect corporate performance because the outside directors are
more likely to support management prerogatives than
shareholder interests, that increasing outsider representation
reduces research and development spending, and that an
outsider-dominated board is more likely to award “golden
parachutes” to the company’s executives.20
Other studies, on the other hand, find that increasing
outsider representation on the board improves corporate

17

Gordon, supra note 6, at 1468-69; see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3,
§ 3A.01 cmt. c (“The effectiveness of the oversight function is conditioned on two
prerequisites: a board that can objectively evaluate the performance of the senior
executives, and an accurate and reliable flow of information to the board concerning
that performance.”).
18
Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between
Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 924, 942 (1999); Victor
Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 597, 635 (1982); Developments, supra note 16, at 2200; Gordon, supra note 6, at
1500-09; Mallette & Fowler, supra note 3, at 1013; Dan L. Worrell, Carol Nemec &
Wallace N. Davidson III, One Hat Too Many: Key Executive Plurality and Shareholder
Wealth, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 499, 501 (1997).
19
Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 386-88; Clark, supra note 5, at 298-301
(summarizing studies showing positive, negative, and nominal impact of director
independence on “firm profitability or performance”); Gordon, supra note 6, at 1468
(“One of the apparent puzzles in the empirical corporate governance literature is the
lack of correlation between the presence of independent directors and the firm’s
economic performance.”); Worrell et al., supra note 18, at 501 (noting that the presence
of outside directors may lead to “positive stock price reactions” and a positive
correlation between outsider presence and “bidding firms’ stock returns in
acquisitions”).
20
Chamu Sundaramurthy, James M. Mahoney & Joseph T. Mahoney, Board
Structure, Antitakeover Provisions, and Stockholder Wealth, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
231, 240 (1997); see also Worrell et al., supra note 18, at 501 (“[O]utside directors are
often chosen by the CEO and may be aligned to management interests.”). “Golden
parachutes” are compensation arrangements “that allow covered managers to
voluntarily resign and collect substantial remuneration—in some cases several million
dollars—after a triggering event, usually a hostile takeover.” Philip L. Cochran, Robert
A. Wood & Thomas B. Jones, The Composition of Boards of Directors and Incidence of
Golden Parachutes, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 664, 664-65 (1985).
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performance in financial accounting measures and stock price.21
Moreover, empirical research indicates that an independent
board is more likely to terminate a CEO after a period of poor
financial performance.22 An independent board may also
enhance shareholder value by reducing the likelihood that
shareholders will bring suits against the company and that the
board will approve greenmail payments.23
Given the mixed results in the correlation between
director independence and corporate performance, the question
of whether, and what portion of, the board should be composed
of independent directors has been a subject of contention.24 This
article explores a specific angle of the director independence
question: whether corporations should separate the positions of
CEO and board Chair so that each position is held by a
different individual.25 Thus, the focus of this article is the
independence of the chairperson of the board—not the
independence of directors generally.

21

James P. Walsh & James K. Seward, On the Efficiency of Internal and
External Corporate Control Mechanisms, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 421, 433 (1990); Worrell
et al., supra note 18, at 501.
22
Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 433.
23
Mallette & Fowler, supra note 3, 1013; Sundaramurthy et al., supra note
20, at 240; Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 433. The corporate practice of paying a
premium price to repurchase shares in order to be rid of a hostile shareholder is known
as paying “greenmail” to the hostile shareholder. CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 244.
24
See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 386-88 (questioning the effect of director
independence on corporate performance); Clark, supra note 5, at 298-301 (counseling
against “one-size-fits-all governmental mandates” that impose director independence
requirements on corporations); Thuy-Nga T. Vo, Rating Management Behavior and
Ethics: A Proposal to Upgrade the Corporate Governance Rating Criteria, 34 J. CORP. L.
1, 12 (2008) (discussing the emphasis that governance rating agencies place on director
independence).
25
This article focuses on whether the board Chair should currently serve as
the company’s CEO. Some proponents of separating the positions would prohibit not
only the current CEO, but also former CEOs of the company, from serving as board
Chairs. Clark, supra note 5, at 271. Other observers see a benefit in having a retired
CEO assume the Chair position; putting the retired CEO on the board retains the
company-specific knowledge valuable to the Chair’s job. James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L.
Coles & Gregg Jarrell, Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the
Board, 3 J. CORP. FIN. 189, 194-95 (1997). Yet others believe that the board should
have a Chair who fully satisfies the independence requirements under regulatory and
listing standards. See Steven Balsam & Arun Upadhyay, Impact of Board Leadership
on Firm Performance: Does It Matter Who Heads the Board? 21 (Mar. 16, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1361255 (“[T]he benefits of having a separate
chair . . . appear to only exist when that chair is an independent director.”).
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Responsibility to Further Shareholder Interests

Underlying the board’s authority to govern is its
responsibility to strive for the corporation’s success, whether
determined by financial profitability or other indices of
performance.26 There has been lively discussion about whether
directors, when making decisions for the corporation, should
consider shareholder interests alone or whether they should
also consider the interests of other stakeholders27 of the
corporation.28 Although this debate continues, after the
appearance of constituency statutes in the 1980s, it became
generally acknowledged that directors may consider various
constituents’ interests in making corporate decisions.29
Although directors may consider other stakeholders’ interests,
and corporate success may be measured in terms other than
financial metrics, a fundamental tenet of corporate law is that
the board is charged with management and monitoring
responsibilities to ensure that corporate actions serve
shareholder best interests and maximize shareholder wealth.30
26

See Ide, supra note 5, at 837-38 (stating that the board’s role to monitor
corporate performance includes not only confirming that the company is meeting its
financial goals but also that the company is achieving legal and regulatory compliance
and human resources management); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 423 (explaining
that measures of corporate performance may include market value, employee turnover,
employee satisfaction, and corporate involvement in illegal activities).
27
See infra Part V for the definition of “stakeholders.”
28
See generally William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the
Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 262-81 (1992) (discussing the
inconsistent conceptions of the corporation as “shareholder property” and “social
entity”); Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values
and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 686-721 (2004) (explaining the debate
over whether corporate fiduciaries should maximize the interests of shareholders alone
or of stakeholders as a group); see also Brudney, supra note 18, at 602-07 (identifying
the debate on whether directors should serve stockholders or other nonstockholder
constituencies); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 422-23 (distinguishing between the
general view in the field of financial economics that shareholder interests are primary
in corporate decisions and the general view in the field of organizational theory that
the interests of many stakeholders are considered in corporate decisions).
29
See, e.g., Allen, supra note 28, at 279-81 (explaining that this conceptual
battle was won in the late 1980s with the endorsement of the entity theory, but
suggesting that the war was far from over); Brudney, supra note 18, at 604-05 (“[A]ll—
except the most devout free market economists—embrace the notion of some social
responsibility . . . . [However,] there is a wide range of views about how much social
responsibility is enough.”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 634
(1992) (explaining that constituency statutes permit directors to consider the effects of
corporate action on constituent groups).
30
Katherine M. Brown, New Demands, Better Boards: Rethinking Director
Compensation in an Era of Heightened Corporate Governance, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1102,
1106 (2007); Brudney, supra note 18, at 602; Gordon, supra note 6, at 1471-72; Mallette
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CURRENT STATUS OF DUALITY

The term “duality” describes the corporate leadership
structure where one individual holds both the CEO and Chair
positions.31 Although duality is pervasive in corporate America,
it is less popular32—or even prohibited33—in other countries.
Duality has been the dominant corporate governance
structure in the United States.34 According to the 1989 Forbes
& Fowler, supra note 3, at 1012; Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active
Board of Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (1998); see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 3.01 cmt. a
(quoting the Corporate Director’s Guidebook that “It is important to emphasize that
the role of the director is to monitor, in an environment of loyal but independent
oversight, the conduct of the business and affairs of the corporation in behalf of those
who invest in the corporation.”); Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail”
During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 5-9
(2009) (discussing the evolution of corporate governance from the managerial
capitalism model in post-World War II to the shareholder value model in the 1980s).
31
See Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42 (“In cases of CEO duality, the CEO of
the firm wears two hats—a CEO hat and a chairperson of the board of directors hat.
Nonduality implies that different individuals serve as the CEO and the chairperson.”);
Brian K. Boyd, CEO Duality and Firm Performance: A Contingency Model, 16
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 301, 301 (1995) (“CEO duality exists when a firm’s chief executive
also serves as Chairman of the board of directors. Otherwise, the board is described as
having an independent structure.”); Wm. Gerard Sanders & Mason A. Carpenter,
Internationalization and Firm Governance: The Roles of CEO Compensation, Top Team
Composition, and Board Structure, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 158, 164 (1998) (“Duality
describes the situation in which an executive holds both the CEO and chairperson of
the board positions.”). A small number of scholars do not use the term “duality” to
specify the number of positions that the CEO holds, but instead use the term to refer to
how many leaders the company has. Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 192. Under that
definition, a unitary leadership structure signifies that there is one individual serving
as both CEO and Chair, and a dual leadership structure refers to two separate people
serving as CEO and Chair. Id.
32
See Dan R. Dalton & Idalene F. Kesner, Composition and CEO Duality in
Boards of Directors: An International Perspective, 18 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 33, 39 (1987)
(finding that duality is the governance structure for 82% of large corporations in the
United States, 30% of large corporations in the United Kingdom, and 10.9% of large
corporations in Japan); MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE,
CHAIRING THE BOARD: THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENT LEADERSHIP IN CORPORATE NORTH
AMERICA 17 (2009) [hereinafter MILLSTEIN REPORT], available at http://www.cii.org/User
Files/file/Millstein%20Center%20Rpt%20-%20Chairing%20the%20Board%203-15-09.pdf
(stating that most public companies in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Singapore,
and the United Kingdom have a nonexecutive Chair); Richard W. Stevenson, Balancing
the Power at the Corporate Top, British Style, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1992, at A4 (reporting
that only 24% of public companies in Britain have duality and that the practice of having
an independent director is common in Britain).
33
See MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 17 (explaining that Germany and
Holland’s requirement of a two-tier board structure by definition separates the CEO
and Chair positions, and South Africa’s Johannesburg Stock Exchange requires listed
companies to split the positions); Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164 n.7
(noting that some countries’ regulation of board structure results in the lack of
consolidation of the CEO and Chair positions).
34
Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164; Stevenson, supra note 32.
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Executive Compensation Survey, out of 661 large U.S. firms,
approximately 81% of the companies maintained a leadership
structure where one individual held both the CEO and Chair
titles; approximately 14% of the companies had different people
in the two positions; and approximately 5% of the companies
did not have a Chair position.35 In 1992, the New York Times
reported that 75% to 80% of companies had one executive who
occupied both the CEO and Chair positions.36 Similarly, a 1992
survey by executive firm Korn Ferry International affirmed
that only 20% of the 1,000 largest corporations in America had
a board Chair who did not also serve as the company’s CEO.37
Although duality remains the most popular corporate
leadership structure in the United States, the proportion of
companies with duality has decreased in recent years.
According to a study of the 1,500 companies in the ExecuComp
database during the period from 1996 to 2005, the percentage
of companies with a combined CEO-Chair steadily decreased
from 76% in 1996 to 69% in 2000 and 60% in 2005.38
Conversely, the proportion of companies with a separate board
Chair steadily increased in that same ten-year period: 24% in
1996, 31% in 2000, and 40% in 2005.39 In its 2009 board
practices study, RiskMetrics Group, a provider of corporate
governance services, reported that 46% of Standard & Poor’s
1,500 companies had separate individuals serving in the CEO
and Chair positions.40
Only a small percentage of the separate board Chairs
are independent directors, but that percentage has also
increased in recent years.41 Prior to 2002, less than 25% of the
companies that separated the CEO and Chair positions had an
independent director who served as board Chair.42 By 2005,
more than 31% of companies that separated the two roles had
an independent director serve as board Chair.43 Almost half of
35

Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 197-98.
Stevenson, supra note 32.
37
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 43.
38
Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 38-39 (all figures have been rounded).
39
Id. (all figures have been rounded).
40
Press Release, RiskMetrics Grp., RiskMetrics Group Releases 2009 Board
Practices Study (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.riskmetrics.com/press/2009bp [hereinafter
RiskMetrics Press Release].
41
See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 39 (identifying the distribution
of leadership structure).
42
Id.
43
Id.
36
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the individuals serving as separate Chairs were independent
directors as of 2009.44
Many companies that do not separate their CEO and
Chair positions appoint a presiding director, commonly known
as a “lead director,” to address conflicts of interest and agencycost concerns that are inherent in duality.45 The lead director’s
job is to advise the CEO-Chair on selecting board committee
members and setting board meeting agendas.46 The lead
director also presides over executive sessions of independent
directors.47
Similar to the increase in the number of companies that
have a separate board Chair, there has been an increase in the
number of companies that have appointed a lead director to
work with the individual who serves as both CEO and Chair.48
Of the companies that combined the CEO and Chair positions,
less than 1% had a lead director in 1996, while almost 4% had
a lead director in 2000.49 By 2005, almost 68% of the companies
that had a combined CEO-Chair also had a lead director.50
Some corporate governance observers regard the
presence of a lead director as an acceptable and effective
alternative to having a separate board Chair.51 Other
commentators, however, view the appointment of a lead
director as a mere symbolic gesture, rather than an actual
attempt to preserve board independence.52 Skeptics see the lead
44

RiskMetrics Press Release, supra note 40.
Jay W. Lorsch & Martin Lipton, On the Leading Edge: The Lead Director,
71 HARV. BUS. REV. 79, 79-80 (1993) (recommending that companies with duality
designate one of the outside directors as the lead director because “[e]ffective
leadership of the outside directors is essential to enable the board to discharge its
monitoring function properly”); Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1287-88. See
Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 8 (“Appointing a lead director could be
considered a compromise leadership structure, one that firms might adopt if they feel
having a separate chair is too costly.”).
46
Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 8; Lorsch & Lipton, supra note 45,
at 79. The CEO-Chair retains the power to appoint committee members and to set
meeting agendas; the lead director, where there is one, provides input and suggestions
to the CEO-Chair in connection with those tasks. Id.
47
Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 55; Clark, supra note 5, at 271. The
lead director does not preside at meetings of the entire board and meetings of
shareholders. Lorsch & Lipton, supra note 45, at 79.
48
Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 16.
49
See id. at 39 (identifying five lead directors in 595 duality companies in
1996 and twenty lead directors in 542 duality companies in 2000).
50
See id. (identifying 405 lead directors in 596 duality companies in 2005).
51
Christopher Caggiano, Call Grows for Separation of CEO and Chairman
Roles, 231 N.Y. L.J. 5, 5 (2004); Clark, supra note 5, at 271; Gordon, supra note 6, at 1495.
52
See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 4 (“[W]e find the existence of a
lead director either has no effect or is negatively associated with firm performance.
45
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director’s presence as inadequate to resolve the conflicts of
interest in duality, pointing to the lead director’s consultative
rather than authoritative role, lack of power to set the board
agenda, and lack of authority to act as the spokesperson for the
company.53 There has not been much empirical research on the
effect of having a lead director in the corporate governance
structure, but one study appears to support the view that the
presence of a lead director does not enhance board performance
or company profitability.54
There is disagreement regarding the causes and
consequences of a company’s top-leadership structure. Why do
firms choose duality for their system of governance, and what
effect does that structure have on company performance?
Supporters explain duality’s persistent prevalence as evidence
of its superiority as a governance structure in the competitive
marketplace.55 As this argument goes, duality is the dominant
leadership structure because corporate boards have determined
that their CEOs have the knowledge and skills to lead both the
board and the management group,56 or because the boards have
given the title of board Chair as an award to the CEO who has
led the company to successful performance.57 Advocates of a
combined CEO-Chair also contend that duality remains

This finding is consistent with firms appointing lead directors for symbolic rather than
substantive purposes.”); MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 9 (“[T]he lead director is
not perceived by . . . fellow board members as the board leader when in the shadow of
the combined CEO and chairman.”).
53
See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 8 (“The difference between having a
separate chair and having a lead director is that the former is nominally the head of the
board which has supervisory authority over the CEO, whereas the latter’s role is normally
more limited.”); Lorsch & Lipton, supra note 45, at 79 (recommending the appointment of a
lead director for consultative and coordinative purposes, and specifying that the lead
director will “not set the agenda nor preside at meetings” nor “act as a spokesperson for the
company”); MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 8 (“The lead director does not run the
meeting. He who sits at the head of the table runs the meeting.”).
54
See infra Part IV.B.2.
55
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 43; Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 199-200.
56
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 43.
57
See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 192, 207 (explaining that most
companies that have separate CEOs and Chairs are in a transitional succession
process of testing new CEOs who would eventually be granted the Chair title);
Harrison et al., supra note 1, at 226-27, 230 (suggesting that successful corporate
financial performance is likely to enhance the power of the CEO and may result in the
CEO being able to acquire the role of board Chair). Some candidates for the CEO
position in fact demand that they get the Chair seat along with the top executive spot.
Joann S. Lublin, Splitting Posts of Chairman, CEO Catches On, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11,
2002, at B1.
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dominant because it is effective in generating shareholder
wealth.58
Advocates of separate CEO and Chair positions, by
contrast, attribute the pervasiveness of duality not to
competitiveness or effectiveness, but instead to the shift toward
a governance structure of “CEO primacy” or “dictatorship of the
CEO,”59 and to the undue influence of executive management in
the board selection process.60 Supporters of separate CEO and
Chair roles also regard duality as the cause of corporate boards’
failure to exercise their management and monitoring
responsibilities to protect shareholder interests.61
III.

THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS ABOUT DUALITY

Some commentators have suggested that the prevalence
of duality implies that a combined CEO and Chair position is
the optimal leadership structure for large public companies.62
Supporters of duality maintain that if duality were not an
effective and efficient governance structure, most public
companies could not maintain duality and still survive in the
competitive marketplace.63 Despite the prevalence of duality in
corporate governance, however, not all of corporate America
believes that duality is the optimal leadership structure. There
58

See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 200 (suggesting that duality not be
denounced without “a cogent explanation for how such an important corporate control
practice can be wealth-decreasing and still survive in the competitive marketplace for
so long across so many companies”).
59
Steven A. Ramirez, The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End
of Corporate Governance Law, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 345, 345 (2007).
60
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 41, 43. See Sydney Finkelstein & Richard A.
D’Aveni, CEO Duality as a Double-Edged Sword: How Boards of Directors Balance
Entrenchment Avoidance and Unity of Command, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1079, 1102 (1994)
(pointing out that the business press often expresses the view that “CEO duality
formally institutionalizes the dominance of CEOs over boards”); Mark J. Roe, Chaos
and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 641 (1996) (“Although
institutions that have survived cannot be too inefficient, evolution-toward-efficiency
constrains but does not fully determine the institutions we observe.”).
61
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 41, 43; MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 13.
62
See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 199-200 (suggesting that the dominance
of duality implies that having an independent chairperson is not likely to be the optimal
leadership structure for most public companies); Lex Donaldson & James H. Davis,
Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns, 16
AUSTL. J. MGMT. 49, 61 (1991) (explaining that based on the stewardship theory of
corporate governance, a majority of large U.S. companies have already adopted the
optimal corporate governance structure where the CEO also serves as the board Chair).
63
Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 199-200; see also Donaldson & Davis,
supra note 62, at 61 (“[S]hould corporations bow to pressures to appoint independent
board chairs[,] the performance of the corporations and the returns to their
shareholders would suffer.”).

78

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

is a view among many shareholders, business leaders, industry
groups, corporate governance advisers, and regulators that
corporate governance is more effective and efficient when the
CEO and Chair positions are separated than when they are
combined.64
Various theories have been advanced for and against
duality. The following analysis focuses on the advantages of the
CEO-Chair and nonexecutive Chair models. In most cases, the
arguments in favor of one leadership structure are essentially
arguments against the other leadership structure.
A.

Arguments Supporting Combined Positions

A unifying theme of the various arguments in support of
duality is that combining the CEO and Chair positions
enhances the board’s management performance. The board’s
management responsibilities require that it make key decisions
affecting the company.65 Proponents of duality contend that
combining the CEO and Chair positions enhances the board’s
management role. A combined CEO-Chair, they argue,
provides the board with more complete and timely information
about the company, provides the company with a unified
command structure and a consistent leadership direction, and
creates a collaborative and collegial environment for board
decision making.66
Taking these arguments separately, the first posits that
the board of directors will benefit from having a Chair who has
deep, first-hand knowledge of the company.67 Proponents
contend that a board Chair who also serves as the CEO is
likely to spend more time at the company, to have more
detailed information about the strengths and weaknesses of the
company, and to have a deeper understanding of the
operational and financial health of the company.68 Presumably,
the CEO would use the knowledge and experience that she
gains from serving as the company’s top executive to contribute
64

See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 189-91 (giving examples of business
leaders, shareholders, regulators, and researchers who oppose duality).
65
See supra Part I.A.
66
See infra Part III.A.
67
See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 194 (“Presumably, CEOs have
unparalleled specialized knowledge regarding the strategic challenges and
opportunities facing the firm.”); Boyd, supra note 31, at 301 (stating that “the CEOChair would be expected to have a greater knowledge of the firm and its industry”).
68
Clark, supra note 5, at 300; cf. Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 194.
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to her role as Chair of the board, leading and guiding the board
to understand, deliberate, and make fundamental business
decisions for the company.69 In that sense, the CEO-Chair’s
“specific knowledge may trump [the] general wisdom and
outside perspective” of a non-CEO Chair in the decisionmaking process.70
A related theory is that combining the CEO and Chair
positions reduces the cost of information transfer between
company leaders.71 A combined CEO-Chair position avoids the
need for the transfer of information that must take place if
different individuals hold the CEO and Chair positions.72
Because information transfer may be costly, untimely, or
incomplete, having critical information reside in one combined
CEO-Chair may improve the ability of that individual to
perform management responsibilities.73
There is some evidence, however, that questions the
degree of information costs that arise from separating the CEO
and Chair positions.74 For one thing, researchers have observed
that a company can mitigate the information costs of
separating top leadership positions by appointing nonexecutive
Chairs with significant experience and in-depth knowledge
based on their long-time membership on the company’s board.75
Moreover, combining the CEO and Chair positions may create
information costs, in that many CEOs impose an unwritten
policy that all communication of information from inside the
company to the board must first be approved by the CEO.76 A
board with a dual CEO-Chair may lack the healthy skepticism
necessary to examine information that has been screened and
filtered by the CEO prior to being provided to the board.77
69

See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 7 (“CEOs have specialized
knowledge regarding the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the firm that is
valuable to the chairman’s job.”).
70
Clark, supra note 5, at 300.
71
Dawn Harris & Constance E. Helfat, CEO Duality, Succession, Capabilities
and Agency Theory: Commentary and Research Agenda, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 901,
903 (1998). See generally Brickley et al., supra note 25.
72
Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 194-95.
73
Harris & Helfat, supra note 71, at 903.
74
See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 199-200 (reporting the average tenure
of independent board chairs in a representative sample).
75
See id.
76
See Ide, supra note 5, at 838-39 (criticizing the practice of the CEO in
screening information to the board and suggesting that others in senior management
provide information directly to the board).
77
See Vo, supra note 24, at 25 (suggesting that directors maintain a healthy
skepticism for information that management provides to the board).

80

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

The second broad argument supporting duality is that a
combined position provides a unified command structure and
reduces the company’s cost of decision making.78 A CEO-Chair
can exert greater authority and speed in making and
implementing strategic decisions for the company.79 Thus,
decisions made by a CEO-Chair may be clearer, timelier, and
more consistent than decisions made by a CEO who has to
negotiate and consult with a board that is led by a separate
Chair.80 In addition, having one individual occupy both the CEO
and Chair positions reduces public confusion about who is in
charge of the company, and clarifies who is responsible for the
company’s performance.81
There are countervailing considerations to the
advantages of duality’s unified command structure. The
concentration of corporate leadership authority in one person,
the CEO-Chair, may constrain board oversight and restrict
board adoption of appropriate strategies that adapt to changing
business environments.82 What appear to be clear and
consistent decisions on the part of the CEO-Chair may turn out
to be manifestations of the executive’s fixation on a set course
of action or unwillingness to adopt new business strategies to
meet pressing competitive conditions.83
The third line of argument in favor of duality is that a
combined CEO-Chair may enhance the board’s performance of
78

Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers &
Urs Peyer, CEO Centrality 10 n.9 (Harvard L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. &
Bus., Discussion Paper No. 601, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030107;
Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1083; Roberta S. Karmel, Splitting the CEO
and Chairman, 231 N.Y. L.J. 3, 3 (2004).
79
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 7;
Boyd, supra note 31, at 301; Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 195; Harris & Helfat,
supra note 71, at 902; cf. Karmel, supra note 78, at 3.
80
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; Boyd, supra note 31, at 301, 304; Brickley
et al., supra note 25, at 195; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1080, 1083;
Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164.
81
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; Boyd, supra note 31, at 301, 304; Brickley
et al., supra note 25, at 195; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079-80, 1083-84;
Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164; Makoto Toda & William McCarty,
Corporate Governance Changes in the Two Largest Economies: What’s Happening in the
U.S. and Japan?, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 189, 213 (2005).
82
See Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42-43 (comparing IBM’s failure to adopt
strategies to prevent loss of market share with Compaq Computer’s successful adoption
of a lower-priced product model); Ramirez, supra note 59, at 370 (“Corporate
governance should operate to limit CEO autonomy and to protect investors; this will
lead to superior outcomes.”).
83
See Boyd, supra note 31, at 301 (explaining that “duality has been blamed
for poor performance and slow response to change in firms such as General Motors,
Digital Equipment Corporation, and Goodyear Tire and Rubber”).
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its management responsibilities by facilitating cooperation
between board directors and company executives.84 Some
scholars have suggested that a board may perform its
managerial role better when there is a collegial and supportive
relationship among directors and officers.85 The CEO is the
leader of the company’s executive group, and several members
of that executive group are also likely to serve as directors on
the board.86 Where the CEO is also the leader of the board of
directors, the joint leadership may prompt more cooperation
between the two groups.87 By enhancing collegiality and
collaboration between board directors and company executives,
a CEO-Chair may thus facilitate consensus that leads to
smooth and efficient decision making.88
Observers of boardroom dynamics indicate that many
corporate boards indeed develop a close-knit culture that
values internal harmony over vigorous debate and dissension.89
However, it is not entirely clear whether and to what extent
the board’s managerial function depends on a collegial
relationship among directors and managers.90 Taking a neutral
84

See Clark, supra note 5, at 278 (asserting that “boards of directors perform
the managerial role better when there is a ‘collegial and collaborative’ mode of
interaction among directors and officers”).
85
See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 35-45
(2002) (arguing that an increased emphasis on the board’s monitoring role may
exacerbate tension and distrust between the outside directors and management, which
may adversely affect the board’s performance of its management role).
86
CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 400; see also Gordon, supra note 6, at 147276 (describing a shift in board composition away from a majority of inside directors
toward a majority of independent directors during the period from 1950 to 2005, but
noting that most corporations maintain one or two inside directors on their boards).
87
Cf. Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42 (explaining that proponents of duality
contend that separating the top leadership positions may create rivalry between the
CEO and the Chair).
88
See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 7 (“Having one leader can also
minimize the potential for rivalry.”); Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1284
(“Board service was largely viewed as honorific and responsive to management
concerns; the arm’s-length relationship implied in the board’s monitoring role over
management was replaced by a collegial relationship between the two . . . .”).
89
Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431; see also Brudney, supra note 18, at
610-17 (explaining that the obstacles to directors’ taking an arm’s-length stance toward
management include unclear legal standards and weak sanctions, limited monetary
incentives, psychological effects of small group dynamics, and social relationships with
management).
90
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 3.02 cmt. d (“The board’s obligation to
oversee the performance of the principal senior executives does not imply an
antagonistic relationship between the board and the executives. Rather, it
contemplates a collegial relationship that is supportive as well as watchful[,] . . .
challenging yet positive, arm’s length but not adversary.”); Brown, supra note 30, at
1107-08 (explaining that board failure often results from a lack of constructive criticism
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or critical position toward certain information provided and
actions taken by senior management does not necessarily
impede a board’s deliberative and decision-making processes.91
Rather, directors who take an objective and probing stance
toward senior executives while deliberating and making
decisions for the company may be more likely to fulfill the
directors’ managerial responsibilities.92 Conversely, interaction
between board directors and corporate executives that is
markedly supportive and accommodating may signal the
board’s improper deference to, and mere rubber-stamping of,
executive decisions and conduct.93
Arguments in support of duality focus primarily on the
potential improvement in the board’s management role,
without much consideration of the board’s other major role—
namely, monitoring executive behavior. While some
commentators suggest that the CEO-Chair has the in-depth
knowledge about the company necessary to effectively monitor
management misconduct,94 the CEO-Chair with a keen
understanding of the company’s strengths and weaknesses may
be the very executive who is engaging in managerial
Notwithstanding
the
knowledge
and
misconduct.95
understanding of the CEO-Chair, the effectiveness of the board
Chair’s monitoring role is obviated when the board Chair
position is occupied by the very same misbehaving CEO.

from the board to management and from information asymmetries between the board
and management).
91
See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7 (2005),
available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/CorporateGovPrinciples.pdf
(“Effective directors maintain an attitude of constructive skepticism; they ask incisive, probing
questions and require accurate, honest answers . . . .”); Developments, supra note 16, at 2200
(explaining that “increased independence and activism need not result in a crippled board”).
92
See Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, HARV. BUS.
REV., Sept. 2002, at 106, 111 (“Perhaps the most important link in the virtuous cycle is
the capacity to challenge one another’s assumptions and beliefs. Respect and trust do
not imply endless affability or absence of disagreement.”).
93
Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431 (explaining that corporate boards
that prize collegiality over objectivity may fail to scrutinize and discipline executives).
94
Cf. Clark, supra note 5, at 300 (discussing the board’s monitoring role).
95
See id. (“One could even argue that independent directors will not know
enough about the company to act as good monitors of potential misconduct and selfdealing, even though it’s hard to then argue that inside directors, with their conflicted
interests, would do better in this role.”); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 424
(affirming that directors in public companies have the ultimate responsibility to
scrutinize the conduct of their company’s top executives).
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Arguments Supporting Separate Positions

Supporters of splitting the CEO and Chair positions
argue that separation enhances the board’s performance of its
management responsibilities by improving both the quality and
the timeliness of board decision making.96 Having a board Chair
who is not an executive of the company may bring fresh
knowledge and insight to the board’s decision-making process.97
With learning and experiences outside of the company whose
board she leads, a nonexecutive Chair may provide unique
perspectives that enhance the board’s performance of its
management duties to deliberate and make strategic and
fundamental business decisions.98
A nonexecutive Chair may also facilitate the board’s
management function by enabling the board to quickly make
decisions and adopt new strategies to meet changing business
environments.99 Supporters of separating the top leadership
positions often point to Compaq Computer as an example of a
company where having a separate Chair enabled the
business—over the strong objection of the company’s CEO—to
adopt a lower-priced product line to remain competitive in the
industry.100 Compaq’s nonexecutive Chair confirmed that
“Compaq’s board was able to act quickly because of the
corporate governance structure in place at Compaq where the
CEO and Chairman roles are distinct.”101 Similarly, the
separation of the CEO and Chair roles at Cypress
Semiconductor Corporation has been regarded as the reason
that the board was able to make a strategic financial decision
to stop the CEO from investing the company’s cash account in
the stock market shortly before the dot-com crash.102 Although
T.J. Rodgers, then-CEO of Cypress Semiconductor, was not
pleased with the board’s decision at the time, he later
acknowledged that he was glad the board stopped him because

96

Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42.
Clark, supra note 5, at 300.
98
Id.; Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164.
99
See Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42 (referring to the contention that
“Roger Smith, in his dual capacities of Chairman and CEO [of General Motors],
restricted board oversight and the adoption of strategies appropriate to the changing
environment”).
100
See, e.g., id. at 43.
101
Id.
102
Caggiano, supra note 51, at 5.
97
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the board’s decision “ended up saving [the company] a lot of
money.”103
Supporters of separating the CEO and Chair positions
contend that the board also performs its monitoring role better
when there is a nonexecutive Chair.104 The monitoring role
requires directors to exert oversight over corporate managers
in order to detect and discipline managerial inefficiencies and
misconduct.105 Thus, duality may cause failure by the board to
effectively monitor and control executive management.106
In public companies, boards of directors delegate day-today management responsibilities instead of personally
performing these tasks themselves.107 With management tasks
delegated, it is crucial that corporate boards effectively monitor
executive managers’ performance.108 The board’s ability to
monitor the CEO and other executives, in turn, depends on the
board’s power to exert control over the CEO and other
executives.109 However, a CEO who also serves as board Chair
has de facto authority over the board, notwithstanding the
board’s legal authority and responsibility to monitor and
control the CEO.110 Where the CEO, by serving simultaneously
as board Chair, has practical authority and influence over
other board members, the board’s power to control the CEO
and other executives is curtailed or ineffective.111 Consequently,
103

Id.
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; Brown, supra note 30, at 1113; Finkelstein
& D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079, 1082; Harris & Helfat, supra note 71, at 902.
105
Gordon, supra note 6, at 1468; Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 790; Millstein
& MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1293.
106
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 189-90;
Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 790; see also Brown, supra note 30, at 1113 (“[T]he board
relationship has shifted from one of ‘CEO domination’ to one of ‘CEO accountability,’ as
companies move to separate CEO and board chairperson positions.”); Ramirez, supra
note 59, at 392 (“[P]ermitting unbridled CEO power to reign in corporate America, as it
does today, is inconsistent with any principled economic view of how corporate
governance should function.”).
107
Brown, supra note 30, at 1107; Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 30, at
1283-84; Mark S. Mizruchi, Who Controls Whom? An Examination of the Relation
Between Management and Boards of Directors in Large American Corporations, 8
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 426, 430 (1983); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 424.
108
Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1292; Sundaramurthy et al., supra
note 20, at 232.
109
Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1292; Sanders & Carpenter, supra
note 31, at 164.
110
Boyd, supra note 31, at 303; Brown, supra note 30, at 1113; Del Jones & James
Kim, Stockholders Want Boards of Independents, USA TODAY, May 14, 1993, at 1B.
111
Boyd, supra note 31, at 303; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079,
1082; Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 233; see also Millstein & MacAvoy, supra
note 30, at 1292 (“Directors who are members of management or are otherwise closely
104
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the board is likely to perform its monitoring function more
effectively when the board Chair does not also serve as the
leader of the executive group that is the very focus of the
board’s monitoring.112
Proponents of duality challenge the theory that a CEOChair effectively controls the modern corporate board. They
contend that board functions are not concentrated in the hands
of the Chair, but are delegated and dispersed to board
committees, such as the compensation and auditing
committees.113 This contention has merit, in that the CEO-Chair
has total and absolute control of the board only when it is a
single-member board.114 However, the modern corporation has a
multi-member board that often contains a number of inside
directors,115 a fact that precipitated the director and board
independence requirements discussed in Part I.B. The CEOChair, as the top-ranking executive, exerts influence and
control over the inside directors who are lower-ranking
executives of the company.116 Outside directors may also feel a
sense of loyalty and gratitude to the CEO because the CEO
often plays an influential, if not decisive, role over the election
of the outside directors.117 In addition, the CEO has immense
power and control over the entire board when that CEO has

linked to management have the same conflict as management in evaluating corporate
performance.”).
112
Boyd, supra note 31, at 303; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079,
1082; Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1292-93; Sundaramurthy et al., supra
note 20, at 233.
113
Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 196; see also Boyd, supra note 31, at 301
(explaining the view that the board Chair position is largely ceremonial and symbolic).
114
Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 196.
115
CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 400; see also Dalton & Kesner, supra note
32, at 35, 39 (finding that more than 30% of board members in a sample of 50 large
companies in the United States are “insiders,” defined as directors who are also fulltime officers of the company); Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 793-94 (citing various
studies’ findings that the proportion of outside directors ranges from 12% to 100%, with
a mean of 70%, for a sample of 384 of the Fortune 500 companies).
116
See Dalton & Kesner, supra note 32, at 35 (expressing doubt that an inside
director can objectively evaluate the CEO); Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at
1082 n.4 (stating that inside directors are likely to have more information about the
company’s operations, but the inside directors’ monitoring ability is likely curtailed
because they are unlikely to contradict the CEO who is their work boss); Kesner et al.,
supra note 6, at 790 (noting the inside directors’ awkward task of evaluating the CEO
who is their day-to-day boss); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 425 (recognizing the
difficulties with getting an unbiased inside director’s assessment of the CEO’s
performance).
117
Brown, supra note 30, at 1113; Gordon, supra note 6, at 1496; Millstein &
MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1284; Mizruchi, supra note 107, at 431; Ramirez, supra
note 59, at 363.

86

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

the ability, as board Chair, to make committee assignments
and, consequently, to hand-pick the directors to assign to
functionally important committees, such as the compensation,
nomination, and audit committees.118
Underlying the theory that a nonexecutive Chair
facilitates both the board’s management and monitoring roles
is the concept of agency costs.119 Those who prefer to see two
separate individuals serve in the CEO and Chair positions
contend that having a separate Chair reduces the agency costs
inherent in the corporate structure that separates control and
ownership.120 As one scholar explains, agency costs arise
because corporate decisions are made by “agents whose
decisions are influenced by private interests”; thus, their
choices might not be made in an optimal fashion to further
shareholder interests.121 When company management acts more
for personal interests than for general shareholder interests,
the board of directors has failed in its duty to monitor and
discipline management.122 Not surprisingly, supporters of duality
argue that having a separate Chair simply shifts the agency costs
118

See Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079, 1082 (commenting that
the chairperson of the board often controls the director nominating process, which gives
the chairperson the power to favor directors who are loyal to the chairperson);
Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 233 (concluding that a CEO who also occupies
the position of board chair compromises the board functions of setting agenda,
governing, and monitoring board committees and management executives).
119
See Donaldson & Davis, supra note 62, at 51 (“Agency and organisational
economics theories predict that when the CEO also holds the dual rôle [sic] of chair,
then the interests of the owners will be sacrificed to a degree in favour of management,
that is, there will be managerial opportunism and agency loss.”); Ramirez, supra note
59, at 377 (“[T]here is powerful evidence that the separation of CEO and chairman of
the board into two positions reduces agency costs and enhances firm value.”).
120
See Boyd, supra note 31, at 304 (citing Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen’s
observation that duality signals that the corporation does not separate its decision
management from its decision control, and that the corporation will suffer in the
competition for survival as a result of such lack of separation); Brickley et al., supra
note 25, at 192-93 (citing Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s definition of agency
costs as the sum of the costs to establish incentive and control mechanisms for
directors and officers and the costs resulting from not providing appropriate or
complete incentives and controls over directors and officers).
121
Bebchuk et al., supra note 78, at 11; see also Walsh & Seward, supra note
21, at 421-22 (citing Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s observation that managers may
be tempted to pursue prestige, power, and other personal interests instead of
shareholder interests).
122
Dalton & Kesner, supra note 32, at 34; see also CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at
500 (citing In re Enron Corp. Final Report of Neal Batson, court-appointed examiner for
Enron, as stating that the Enron board could have prevented or minimized the Enron
officers’ misconduct by terminating the officers’ employment, refusing to approve the
company’s financial statements, and notifying the SEC of the officers’ wrongdoing); Gordon,
supra note 6, at 1469 (“Independent directors . . . enhance the fidelity of managers to
shareholder objectives, as opposed to managerial interests or stakeholder interests.”).
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from controlling the combined CEO-Chair’s behavior to
controlling the separate Chair’s behavior.123 However, for the
reasons discussed below, the agency costs of controlling the
nonexecutive Chair’s behavior are likely to be lower than the
agency costs of controlling a board Chair who also serves as CEO.
A nonexecutive Chair may reduce agency costs through
her control of information flow to the board and control over
the board agenda.124 Having a separate Chair provides the
board with an additional source of information besides the
CEO.125 This independent source of information is vital to both
the board’s decision-making and oversight functions, because
empirical studies126 and anecdotal evidence127 suggest that
company executives attempt to circumvent the corporate
system of checks and balances by controlling the flow of
information to the board. In addition, the board Chair has the
power to set the agenda for board meetings.128 A board Chair
123

Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 193-94.
Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082; see also Baliga et al., supra
note 2, at 41-42 (citing research on management’s domination of the board through
managerial control of information flow); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431
(explaining that executives may attempt to cover up their negative qualities or low
performance by controlling the board’s meeting agenda and withholding relevant
information from the board).
125
Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164; see also CHIAPPINELLI, supra
note 3, at 501-03 (citing In re Enron Corp. Final Report of Neal Batson, that the
company’s management “failed to present clearly Enron’s SPE transactions and the
total amount and maturities of its off-balance sheet debt to the Finance Committee, . . .
used misleading terms and confusing jargon, and . . . presented information to the
Enron Board and its committees in a manner that obfuscated the substance of the SPE
transactions”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 921, 935 (2007) (noting that CEOs tend to provide the board with ample
information relating to successful or promising projects while giving scant information
about projects that go awry).
126
See, e.g., Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 41-42 (listing empirical studies
conducted throughout the 1970s and 1980s); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431
(listing empirical studies).
127
See CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 504 (citing In re Enron Corp. Final
Report of Neal Batson, that “the Enron board did not function as an effective check and
balance. This failure may have resulted from . . . a carefully orchestrated strategy of
Enron’s senior officers . . . .”); Judith H. Dobrzynski, Chairman and CEO: One Hat Too
Many, BUS. WK., Nov. 18, 1991, at 124 (reporting that at Salomon Inc., “the board was
kept in the dark long after [then] Chairman and CEO John H. Gutfreund learned of
Salomon’s transgressions” of illegal bidding in Treasury security auctions); Stevenson,
supra note 32 (explaining that Fisons P.L.C.’s decision to split its CEO and Chair
positions was implemented “primarily to assuage the concerns of shareholders about
too much power resting with a single executive who did not seem inclined to keep
shareholders fully briefed on the company’s difficulties”).
128
Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082; Sundaramurthy et al.,
supra note 20, at 233; see also CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 498-99 (stating that Ken
Lay was the Chairman and CEO of Enron and that Enron management provided board
members with agendas for board meetings (citation omitted)).
124
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who does not also serve as the company’s CEO may be more
likely to focus the board agenda on, and provide board
members with information about, issues that question
management judgment or challenge management decisions.129
Having separate individuals serve in the CEO and
Chair positions may also reduce agency costs because a board
that is led by a nonexecutive Chair is more likely to evaluate
objectively whether management’s performance, including that
of the CEO, enhances shareholder interests.130 When the roles of
CEO and board Chair are combined in the same person,
directors are put in the awkward position of evaluating a CEO
who is, at the same time, their leader on the board and the
person on whom they depend for board nominations and
committee assignments.131 The situation is even worse for
directors who are also executives of the company; for these
inside directors, there is the added tension of evaluating the
individual who is their top executive boss and who plays a
large role in their position advancement, compensation, and job
security.132 Thus, although the board is often regarded as the
129

See Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 41-42 (referring to research that shows
company executives circumvent the corporate system of checks and balances by
controlling board agendas); Sanford V. Berg & Stanley K. Smith, CEO and Board
Chairman: A Quantitative Study of Dual vs. Unitary Board Leadership, 3 DIRECTORS &
BOARDS 34, 34-35 (1978) (“[S]elective presentation of information to the Board of
Directors can permit the CEO to continue in unprofitable activity—in the hopes that
some unforeseen event will reverse the downward trend.”); Finkelstein & D’Aveni,
supra note 60, at 1082 (commenting that the chairperson of the board can “dominate
both the agenda and content of board meetings”).
130
Boyd, supra note 31, at 302; Wallace N. Davidson III, Carol Nemec & Dan
L. Worrell, Succession Planning vs. Agency Theory: A Test of Harris and Helfat’s
Interpretation of Plurality Announcement Market Returns, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 179,
179 (2001); Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 232. See Baliga et al., supra note 2,
at 42-43 (explaining the contention that IBM’s duality governance structure is to blame
for “the board’s difficulty in critically evaluating management performance and
exercising independent judgment”).
131
See Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42 (explaining that combining the CEO
and Chair roles may make it difficult for directors to be candid when evaluating
company performance); Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079, 1082
(commenting that the chairperson of the board often controls the director nominating
process, which gives the chairperson the power to favor directors who are loyal to the
chairperson); Mizruchi, supra note 107, at 431 (stating the widely held view that
“board members are handpicked by management”); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at
431 (citing a study’s finding that directors who “challenge[d] the president’s powers of
control were advised . . . that such conduct was inappropriate or were asked to resign”).
132
See Dalton & Kesner, supra note 32, at 35 (expressing doubt that an inside
director can objectively evaluate the CEO); Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at
1082 n.4 (stating that inside directors are likely to have more information about the
company’s operations, but the inside directors’ monitoring ability is likely curtailed
because they are unlikely to contradict the CEO who is their work boss); Kesner et al.,
supra note 6, at 790 (noting the inside directors’ awkward task of evaluating the CEO
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shareholders’ “first line of defense” against mismanagement,133
a board that is led by a person holding both the Chair and CEO
positions is not likely to intervene when management’s
behavior is inconsistent with shareholder interests.134
Furthermore, the CEO-Chair, in the role of board Chair,
would essentially be evaluating his own performance as CEO.135
It seems unlikely that the CEO-Chair—a successful business
executive who has been elevated to serve concurrently in the
top two leadership positions of a company—would rate his own
performance as lackluster.136 Supporters of a separate Chair
thus believe that the CEO whose performance is being
evaluated should not be put in charge of the team conducting
the evaluation.137 As one governance expert observed, “One of
the major functions of the board is to supervise management. If
the chairman of the board is also in management, then he is in
effect marking his own exam papers.”138
Another argument in support of separating the top
leadership positions is that it minimizes the risk of
entrenchment.139 A board operating under the leadership of a
who is their day-to-day boss); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 425 (recognizing the
difficulties with getting an unbiased assessment from an inside director’s assessment
of the CEO’s performance).
133
Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1081.
134
Dalton & Kesner, supra note 32, at 35.
135
Davidson et al., supra note 130, at 180; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note
60, at 1082.
136
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 125, at 935 (“The CEO, like most of us,
wants to appear in a good light. She has the incentive to put the best spin on her
accomplishments.”); Albert A. Cannella, Jr. & Michael Lubatkin, Succession as a
Sociopolitical Process: Internal Impediments to Outsider Selection, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J.
763, 765 (1993) (citing evidence that “powerful CEOs, when confronted with poor
performance, may try to deflect the blame onto weaker subordinates, who are then
dismissed while the CEO remains”); Dobrzynski, supra note 127, at 124 (“You can
hardly blame a CEO for refusing to recognize the need for new talent at the top.”);
Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431 (suggesting that executives value their job
security and “strive to make sure that the board sees them as high-effort/high-ability
people”).
137
See Dalton & Kesner, supra note 32, at 35 (asking whether it is
“appropriate that the very person to be evaluated is the head of the evaluation team”);
Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 790 (explaining that “chairmen/CEOs cannot represent
the shareholders in the first role and at the same time impartially sit in judgment on
their own performance in the second role”).
138
Stevenson, supra note 32 (quoting Blenyth Jenkins, the director of
corporate affairs for the Institute of Directors, a London trade group).
139
See Cannella & Lubatkin, supra note 136, at 770 (suggesting that
incumbent CEOs who also hold the board Chair title have more institutional power
than those who do not also serve as board Chair and, therefore, “may be able to
forestall their own removal”); Harrison et al., supra note 1, at 216 (commenting that a
person holding both the CEO and Chair positions is “more powerful and less easily
dislodged”); Ramirez, supra note 59, at 385 (“[T]he powerful will seek to entrench their
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CEO-Chair lacks the motivation and incentive to objectively
evaluate and discipline the dual executive,140 which increases
the risk of entrenching the CEO-Chair in both positions.141
CEO-Chair entrenchment, in turn, increases the potential for
this powerful executive to use the corporation to further his
own personal interests instead of furthering general
shareholder welfare.142 Supporters of separating the positions
buttress their position by pointing to well-recognized strategies
of managerial entrenchment in a duality system, including the
wrangling of a generous base salary for the executive and the
engineering of a bonus compensation system that is not tied to
company performance in the stock market.143
In addition, an executive who can secure the role as the
integrating mechanism between the management group and
the board of directors—namely, the role of a combined CEO
and Chair—may have succeeded in raising his value in the
managerial labor market and enhancing his image as
irreplaceable in the eyes of shareholders and directors.144 Famed
governance scholars Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen warn
that allowing the CEO to also occupy the role of board Chair
signals that the corporation has failed to separate its decision
management from its decision control, which increases the
likelihood that the CEO-Chair will take inefficient and
opportunistic actions that deviate from shareholder interests
and reduce shareholder wealth.145
Supporters of duality respond to the entrenchment
argument by pointing out that even where one individual
occupies both the CEO and Chair positions, the board as a
control and position, rather than expose themselves to a truly competitive
environment . . . . There are few incumbents more powerful than the incumbent CEOs
of public corporations.”).
140
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 41, 43.
141
Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079, 1082, 1102; see also Walsh
& Seward, supra note 21, at 432 (explaining that a key “entrenchment strategy is to
neutralize the control mechanisms themselves”).
142
Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082; see also Mallette & Fowler,
supra note 3, at 1028 (commenting that the “power and influence of a CEO-chairperson
provide an opportunity to increase job security and personal well-being at the expense
of shareholders”); Ramirez, supra note 59, at 348 (asserting that the United States
corporate governance system is “devolving towards CEO primacy and the end of
shareholder primacy”).
143
Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 432; see also Ramirez, supra note 59, at
376 (explaining that study results show that enhanced CEO power is correlated to
higher CEO compensation but not to CEO performance).
144
See Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 432 (describing various managerial
entrenchment practices).
145
Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082.
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whole retains the power to hire and fire senior management,
including the CEO.146 While they concede that it may be easier
for a board to remove a CEO who is not also the Chair than to
remove a CEO-Chair, proponents of duality assert that the
board can and does exert its removal power.147 Examples
include the board’s removal of CEO-Chair Kay Whitmore from
Eastman Kodak, CEO-Chair Robert Stempel from General
Motors, CEO-Chair John Akers from IBM, CEO-Chair James
Robinson from American Express, and CEO-Chair Paul Lego
from Westinghouse.148 Proponents of separating the top
leadership positions, however, contend that these removals
would have occurred earlier if the ousted CEOs were not also
board Chairs.149
Another agency argument favoring the separation of the
CEO and Chair positions is that nonexecutive Chairs have
more incentives than CEO-Chairs to carry out their
management and monitoring functions in ways that further
shareholder interests.150 This is because a nonexecutive Chair
does not receive a salary from the corporation, and the fees for
serving on the board are often modest compared to the Chair’s
other sources of income.151 Furthermore, intangible incentives,
such as avoiding social criticism and protecting reputation,
146

Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 196; see also Mizruchi, supra note 107, at
433 (explaining that the board has the ultimate control in the corporation because of its
power to hire and fire the CEO).
147
Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 196.
148
Id.
149
Id.; see also Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 41-42 (referring to research that
shows company executives circumventing the corporate system of checks and balances
by resisting management changes despite evidence of poor performance); Finkelstein &
D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1081 (stating that independent directors are more likely
than insider directors to remove a CEO who has performed poorly).
150
See Clark, supra note 5, at 300 (explaining that independent directors have
less incentives to act contrary to shareholder interests); Gordon, supra note 6, at 1471
(noting that independent directors are “less dependent on the CEO and more sensitive
to external assessments of their performance as directors”); Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J.
1521, 1529-30 (2005) (commenting that outside directors may be more effective than
inside directors in monitoring management conduct because their financial dependence
on the corporation, in most cases, is limited to a fixed director fee instead of a variable
management compensation package, which is subject to fluctuation depending on the
financial performance of the corporation); see also infra note 191 and accompanying
text for the counterargument that independent directors are not truly independent
because they are selected by management and lack personal incentives to act
independently of management.
151
Brown, supra note 30, at 1114-15; Clark, supra note 5, at 300; see also
Romano, supra note 150, at 1529-30 (noting that independent directors have no
incentive to contribute to audit failures by misstating earnings “because their financial
dependence on the corporation is limited to directors’ fees”).
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may encourage a nonexecutive Chair to act in the interests of
shareholders instead of merely following management’s
dictates.152 Thus, a board led by an independent Chair may be
more open to considering and accepting a takeover bid,153 an
action that has been demonstrated to result in an increase in
shareholder value.154 On the other hand, a board led by a CEOChair is more likely to adopt poison pills and to resist takeover
bids,155 defensive actions that generally result in a decrease in
shareholder value.156
A response to the argument that a nonexecutive Chair
has more incentive to protect shareholder interests is that any
danger to shareholder interests from combining the CEO and
Chair positions may be mitigated by external monitoring and
by internal alignment of CEO interests with shareholder
interests through compensating the CEO with large amounts of
company stock and stock options.157 This response is weakened,
however, by the apparent failure of external monitors, such as
152

Brown, supra note 30, at 1116; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at
1081-82; see also Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 391 (explaining that “if the company fails
on their watch . . . the independent directors’ reputation . . . is likely to suffer”).
153
See Clark, supra note 5, at 300 (stating that independent directors are
more accepting of, and less resistant to, takeover bids).
154
Empirical studies show that shareholders of the acquired company
experience large stock gains following announcement of a takeover bid, while
shareholders of the acquiring company do not suffer an offsetting loss of stock value.
Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 435. Results from such studies suggest that
takeovers result in no net shareholder loss; thus, takeover activities, overall, are
beneficial to the economy. Id.
155
See Boyd, supra note 31, at 302 (noting that signs of CEO-Chairs’
ineffective governance include resistance to hostile takeovers and adoption of poison
pills); Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082 (citing study results that show a
positive correlation between duality and adoption of poison pills).
156
See Ramirez, supra note 59, at 375-76 (finding that anti-takeover
mechanisms generally correlate with higher executive compensation, lower
productivity, and lower profitability). Empirical studies show that a company’s stock
price drops significantly “upon the announcement of a poison pill adoption, while share
prices increased significantly if the firms abandoned plans to adopt a poison pill.”
Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 439; see also Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen
Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance? 2-4 (Harvard L. Sch., John M. Olin
Ctr. for L., Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=593423 (arguing that golden parachutes and poison pills correlate to a
reduction in shareholder value). See generally John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation
in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001) (describing
takeover defenses and the types of companies that adopt them); Marcel Kahan &
Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive
Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2002) (describing the takeover
movement, antitakeover techniques, and the market’s adaptive response to
antitakeover devices).
157
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 43; Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 196;
Donaldson & Davis, supra note 62, at 52.
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outside lawyers, independent accountants, credit rating
agencies, securities analysts, and governmental agencies, to
monitor executive misconduct in connection with the wellpublicized scandals involving major corporations and
investment funds in the past decade.158 In addition, the recent
revelation of the common practice of backdating executive stock
options159 suggests that endowing CEOs with stocks and stock
options does not necessarily align executive and shareholder
interests; instead, it may exacerbate executive greed and
prompt executive mismanagement.160
C.

Weighing the Theoretical Arguments About Duality

Weighing the theoretical arguments for and against
duality is not an easy task. Some would argue that the
weighing analysis should be left to each corporation because
the costs and benefits of different governance structures may
vary among companies, resulting in different optimal
governance structures for each company.161 For example, some
scholars believe that companies often use the Chair title as an
158

See CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 510-27 (discussing the roles of external
monitors in the Enron and WorldCom corporate scandals); Kara Scannell, The Madoff
Fraud: SEC Botched Inquiries into Madoff Scheme, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at C3
(summarizing an SEC inspector general report’s finding that the SEC “botched
numerous opportunities to uncover Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, in part because of
an inexperienced staff and delays in examinations”). See generally ENRON: CORPORATE
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004)
(collecting works by various scholars and experts in the field of corporate governance
regarding the failures of internal and external gatekeepers and the background events
surrounding the collapse of Enron).
159
See Richard Hill, Cox: SEC Probing over 100 Cases Involving Reporting;
New Rules Halt Slide, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1567, 1567 (Sept. 18, 2006)
(backdating stock options “involves misrepresenting the date that an option is granted
so that it appears to be awarded at a time when the underlying stock price is at a low
point, thereby maximizing the potential profit to be gained when the stock option is
exercised at a later date”); SEC Is Probing More than 100 Cases Involving Possible
Fraud in Option Reporting, 75 U.S. L.W. 2135, 2136 (Sept. 12, 2006) (recognizing that
although SOX requires real-time reporting of stock option grants, backdating has
continued where options are filed late and not in compliance with statutory
requirements).
160
See Ramirez, supra note 59, at 366-67 (opining that the practice of
backdating stock options seems “more about the crass enrichment of executives than
creating any incentive for performance”); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 434
(discussing the lack of consensus on whether increasing managerial ownership of
company stock increases the alignment of management’s interests with those of outside
shareholders).
161
Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 197; Boyd, supra note 31, at 309; see also
Karmel, supra note 78, at 3 (advocating against “[a] one size fits all command and
control corporate governance regulation” because it “would stifle the experimentation
that leads to good governance practices”).
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internal incentive mechanism for a new CEO.162 According to
this view, most of the companies that have separate CEOs and
Chairs are in a transitional succession process of testing new
CEOs who will eventually be awarded the Chair title.163 These
scholars caution against requiring companies to separate the
CEO and Chair positions because doing so would compel
companies to change their internal succession processes and
CEO incentive systems.164
Viewed in a different light, however, duality may not be
the result of a deliberate succession planning process, but
instead may be a signal that the company lacks a process for
succession planning and for developing future leaders to run
the company beyond the tenure of the current CEO-Chair.165
Governance observers who take this view explain duality as the
result of agency problems that arise when the board, beholden
to the powerful individual holding both the CEO and Chair
positions, fails to plan for leadership succession.166
Another argument in support of letting each company
decide for itself is that the decision to combine or separate the
CEO and Chair positions is a strategic decision in response to
external pressures167 and competitive uncertainty, such as the
availability of resources in the industry, the level of instability
or volatility in the industry, and the amount of competition in
the industry.168 According to this argument, a company that
operates in a highly competitive environment would prefer the
consolidation of leadership power and the faster decisionmaking process that a duality governance structure provides.169
When leadership is concentrated in a combined CEO-Chair, the
corporation may respond to changing business conditions more
quickly and cohesively, and the benefits of a fast and unified
response outweigh the potential agency costs of duality.170
Conversely, a corporation that operates in a stable
environment has less need for a powerful CEO and more time
162

Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 192, 207, 209.
Id.
164
Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 192.
165
See Harris & Helfat, supra note 71, at 901 (suggesting that combining the titles
of president, chief executive, and board chair indicates a lack of succession planning).
166
See id. at 903 (discussing investor concerns about lack of succession
planning when companies consolidate leadership titles).
167
Harrison et al., supra note 1, at 225.
168
Boyd, supra note 31, at 305-06.
169
Id. at 305.
170
Id.
163
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for consensus decision making.171 Thus, without the need for
decision speed, the company would want to install an
independent Chair to minimize the potential agency costs of
managerial abuse.172
There are weaknesses in the contention that each
company should be permitted to adopt its choice of governance
structure in order to respond appropriately to the level of
external pressures that the company faces. In the same way
that the levels of external pressure are not the same for all
companies, the level of external pressure for any one company
is not likely to remain the same for an extended period of time
or for the entire life of that company.173 Accordingly, it would be
expected that companies change their top leadership structure
over time as they go through periods of high external
uncertainty (where the companies would opt for a unified
duality structure) or low external pressures (where the
companies would adopt an independent leadership structure).
But empirical studies do not indicate that companies
consciously choose their leadership structure as a strategic
response to different levels of external pressure. For example,
in a study of 181 companies for the five-year period from 1986
to 1991, researchers found that less than one-third of these
companies changed their leadership structure by combining or
separating the CEO and Chair positions during the sample
period.174 These data suggest that more than two-thirds of the
companies either experienced the same level of external
pressures during the five-year sample period or, despite
experiencing changing levels of competitive demands during
those years, did not consider adopting or abandoning duality as
a strategic response.
Furthermore, if companies facing competitive pressure
strategically choose duality for its fast and unified decisionmaking process, we should see a general increase in the
171

Id.
Id.
173
See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 145-59 (2006) (describing the spurts
and stops in the growth of the economy and business enterprises in the United States).
174
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 45. Of the sample, 12 of the companies (6.6%)
had separate CEO and Chair positions over the entire sample period, 111 of the
companies (61.3%) had combined roles over the entire sample period, and 58 of the
companies (32%) changed their leadership structure to or away from duality during the
sample period. Id. Another study of 671 companies finds that 94 of these companies
(14%) changed their leadership structure by combining or separating the CEO and
Chair positions during the two-year period from 1978 to 1980. Harrison et al., supra
note 1, at 226.
172
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number of companies choosing to consolidate their CEO and
Chair positions—due to the need to respond to the generally
increasing complexity and competitive nature of business both
in the United States and globally.175 However, as discussed in
Part II, it appears from various surveys that the trend in
leadership structure has been a decrease in duality and an
increase in separating the CEO and Chair positions. Although
duality remains the dominant leadership governance structure
in the United States, this dominance has decreased from a
level of approximately 80% of the companies in the early 1990s
to a level of approximately 60% of the companies in more
recent years.176 In light of the increasingly complex and
competitive nature of domestic and global business activities,
the data showing decreasing duality refute the argument that
duality is a corporate strategy to respond to heightened
business complexity and competitiveness.
The discussion in this section thus far has focused on
the countervailing considerations to letting each company
make its own decision about duality. The article now evaluates
the theoretical arguments about duality to determine which
leadership structure better supports the directors’ fundamental
responsibilities to oversee business operations and monitor
management conduct. Viewed from this analytical framework,
the theoretical arguments suggest that companies should
separate the CEO and Chair positions.
Separating the CEO and Chair positions provides a
governance framework better suited to the fulfillment of the
directors’ management and monitoring responsibilities. Duality
may enhance the board’s performance of its management
responsibilities because a CEO-Chair brings to the board a
deep knowledge about the company, and duality permits clearcut authority in one combined CEO-Chair that enables
consistent and timely decision making by the company.177 The
knowledge and information advantage of duality, however,
diminishes when the company can put in place a nonexecutive

175

See Jacket Cover of THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005)
(“And with this ‘flattening’ of the globe, which requires us to run faster in order to stay
in place, has the world gotten too small and too fast for human beings and their
political systems to adjust in a stable manner?”); Berg & Smith, supra note 129, at 34
(“The complexities of managing the modern corporation have been noted by many
observers.”).
176
See supra Part II.
177
See supra Part III.A.
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Chair that has long served on the board.178 Any confusion about
the line of authority and accountability may also be mitigated
by clearly delineating and communicating the division of
responsibilities between the CEO and the Chair.179
Furthermore, the consistency of decisions resulting from
duality’s unified command structure may be detrimental if it
renders the company resistant or slow to change strategies in
order to meet evolving business conditions.180
While a combined CEO-Chair may facilitate collegiality
and consensus between the executive and director groups—
thereby enhancing the board’s deliberation and decisionmaking process—any potential benefit that a collegial
environment might bring to the board’s management function
may come at the expense of the board’s monitoring function.181
The cordial and deferential attitude that often prevails in the
corporate boardroom may inhibit the objectivity and healthy
vigilance that directors need to maintain while making conflictof-interest decisions involving senior management or other
strategic decisions affecting the company.182 For example, the
supportive and accommodating relationship that existed on the
Enron board of directors was regarded as a contributing factor
in the board’s failure to detect and prevent the financial fraud
perpetrated by Enron’s top executives.183 As an investigation
committee of the United States Senate reported:
Enron board members uniformly described internal Board relations
as harmonious . . . . The Directors also described a good working
relationship with Enron management. Several had close personal
relationships with Board Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) Kenneth L. Lay. All indicated they had possessed great
respect for senior Enron officers, trusting the integrity and
competence of Mr. Lay; President and Chief Operating Officer (and

178

Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 199-200.
MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 19.
180
See Boyd, supra note 31, at 301 (pointing to examples where duality may
have resulted in the company’s inability or unwillingness to adopt strategic changes).
181
See MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 19 (“[C]ombining the roles fosters
a more friendly board environment, just as it encourages more complacent boards.”);
Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431 (explaining that corporate boards that prize
collegiality over objectivity may fail to scrutinize and discipline executives).
182
See MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 19 (“While mindless animosities
and ego contests in the boardroom can be counterproductive, directors who applaud
and rubberstamp all actions of the CEO without asking difficult questions are not
fulfilling their duties.”).
183
See CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 491-510 (describing the Enron scandal).
179
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later CEO) Jeffrey K. Skilling; Chief Financial Officer Andrew S.
Fastow . . . .184

The Enron failure exemplifies the risk that a board committed
to being friendly and harmonious to inside directors and other
inside executives will ignore or downplay the red flags of
management misconduct.
Whereas duality may enhance the board’s management
function, but hinder its oversight responsibilities, separating
the CEO and Chair positions may enable the board to fulfill
both its management and monitoring roles. Having a
nonexecutive Chair may facilitate the board’s management and
decision-making process by assuring appropriate information
and topics are put forth to the board for consideration.185 In
addition, a nonexecutive Chair may bring an outside
perspective and fresh insights to assist the board in its
deliberation and decision making.186
Separating the top executive and board roles may also
provide directors with an environment more conducive to
carrying out their oversight responsibilities. A nonexecutive
Chair may be more likely to provide the board with information
about—and to include in the board agenda—matters that raise
questions about management judgment or questions that
management may be reluctant to address.187 In addition, a
nonexecutive Chair is more likely to provide—and also more
likely to encourage other directors to provide—an objective
evaluation of executive performance.188 Such objectivity is
necessary for the board to carry out its tasks of disciplining

184

See id. at 498 (citation omitted).
See Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082 (commenting that the
chairperson of the board has control over both the agenda and content of board
meetings); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431 (explaining that executives may
attempt to cover up their negative qualities or low performance by withholding
relevant information from the board).
186
Clark, supra note 5, at 300; Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164.
187
See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms),
146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 139-46 (1997) (explaining that senior executives may be
motivated to avoid reporting their suboptimal decisions, mistakes, and failures due to
the concern that such reports may reflect poorly on them); Walsh & Seward, supra note
21, at 431 (explaining that executives may attempt to cover up their negative qualities
or low performance by controlling the board’s meeting agenda and withholding relevant
information from the board).
188
See Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 43 (explaining that duality may result in
“the board’s difficulty in critically evaluating management performance and exercising
independent judgment”).
185
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managerial inefficiencies and misconduct that destroy
shareholder value.189
A separate Chair thus gives the board a stronger chance
of reining in agency problems inherent in the separation of
corporate control and ownership—problems that are likely to
be exacerbated when ultimate directorial and executive power
reside in one individual. A useful analogy is that, in corporate
governance, as in political government, a system of checks and
balances is the best protection against abuse of power.190 The
theoretical arguments on duality suggest that separating the
CEO and Chair positions allows the board to better exert its
management and oversight authority in furtherance of
shareholder interests.
Some may contest the notion that separating the CEO
and Chair roles would facilitate performance of the board’s
management and monitoring roles and would thus better serve
shareholder interests. These skeptics may point to the fact
that, although technically elected by shareholders, all directors
are actually selected by management and are therefore not
truly independent from management when exercising the
directors’ decision-making and oversight responsibilities.191
However, it is difficult to argue that just because some
directors’ independence may be compromised, we might as well
give up on objectivity altogether and just let the CEO also chair
the board. Moreover, questioning whether any director is truly
independent from management does not advance the case for
duality because supporters of duality often argue that “the
danger of shareholder harm from combined titles can be
counter-balanced
by
effective
independent
outside
directors . . . .”192
In sum, duality may bring some benefits to the board’s
management role, but duality also carries substantial risks to
the board’s monitoring function. Having a nonexecutive Chair,
on the other hand, appears to bring considerable benefits to the
189

Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 790.
Paula L. Rechner & Dan R. Dalton, The Impact of CEO as Board
Chairperson on Corporate Performance: Evidence vs. Rhetoric, 3 ACAD. MGMT.
EXECUTIVES 141, 141 (1989) [hereinafter Rechner & Dalton 1989 Study].
191
See Brown, supra note 30, at 1113 (“Directors who displeased a CEO often
found it difficult to keep their seats on the board, which made it hard for the directors
to maintain independence from the CEO.”); Gordon, supra note 6, at 1496 (noting that
directors may feel a sense of loyalty and gratitude to the CEO who helped to put them
on the board); Worrell et al., supra note 18, at 501 (“[O]utside directors are often
chosen by the CEO and may be aligned to management interests.”).
192
Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 196.
190

100

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

board in both its management and monitoring responsibilities.
The risks that a nonexecutive Chair may have less knowledge
about the inner working of the company than a CEO-Chair, or
that a nonexecutive Chair may be less adept at creating a
collegial atmosphere between management and the board, can
be alleviated without much difficulty. A board with a separate
Chair can still benefit from the CEO’s knowledge and expertise
about the company, and from the CEO’s ability to facilitate a
collaborative relationship between management and the board,
by having the CEO serve as a director on the board—just not in
the Chair position.
Efforts to alleviate the potential loss of executive
expertise and board collegiality that may arise from having a
nonexecutive Chair appear to be more manageable than
attempting to mitigate the agency costs of duality. The board’s
objective monitoring of management performance is essential
for the protection of shareholder interests. The potential
managerial inefficiencies and misconduct that may result from
weak oversight and ineffective monitoring by a CEO-Chair far
outweigh any potential loss of knowledge and collegiality on
the board that is led by a nonexecutive Chair.
IV.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DUALITY

A number of studies provide statistical evidence about
the impact of CEO duality on corporate performance, as
measured by financial and nonfinancial metrics. The following
discussion focuses on the research findings that have been
offered to advance or reject the notion that duality, being the
dominant corporate governance structure in the United States,
is the optimal governance structure to further shareholder
interests. Much of the empirical evidence suggests that
separating the CEO and Chair positions has a positive effect on
the financial and nonfinancial performance of the company.
A.

Evidence Supporting Combined Position
1. Nonfinancial Measures of Corporate Performance

the

Kesner, Victor, and Lamont (1985). This study examines
relationship between duality and the company’s
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involvement in illegal activities.193 The study’s sample includes
274 companies that were continuously listed on the Fortune
500 and that consistently maintained a governance structure
that either separated or combined the roles of the CEO and
board Chair during the period from 1980 through 1984.194 Of the
sample, 245 (89%) of the companies had one individual serving
both as CEO and board Chair, and 29 (11%) of the companies
had two individuals serving in the separate positions.195 The
study focuses on the sample companies’ involvement in price
discrimination, tying arrangements, price fixing, monopoly,
conspiracy, and other violations of antitrust laws and the
Federal Trade Commission Act.196 The study tallies the number
of times in which the sample companies were found guilty in
litigated cases, were subject to consent decrees in nonlitigated
cases, or were charged in cases where the court found
substantial merits to the charges.197
The number of illegal acts over the test period ranges
from zero to seventeen occurrences for each company in the
sample, with a mean of less than one occurrence for all
companies in the sample, and a mean of three occurrences for
those companies that were involved in some types of illegal
activities.198 Without giving specific data, the researchers
conclude that “firms where one individual serves as both CEO
and chairman are no more likely to be associated with illegal
acts than those firms in which separate individuals hold these
positions.”199
2. Financial Measures of Corporate Performance
Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma (1985). This study
focuses on the relationship between duality and financial
health of twenty-one pairs of companies in the retail industry.200
In each pair, one company failed during the period from 1970 to
193

See Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 792-93 (hypothesizing that companies
that combine the CEO and Chair positions are more likely to commit illegal acts than
companies that separate the positions).
194
Id. at 793-94.
195
Id. at 795.
196
Id. at 793.
197
Id. at 794.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 796.
200
Rajeswararao S. Chaganti, Vijay Mahajan & Subhash Sharma, Corporate
Board Size, Composition and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry, 22 J. MGMT.
STUD. 400, 408 (1985).
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1976, and the other company of comparable type and size in the
pair did not fail during that period.201 The study defines a
“failed” company as one that has filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.202 The study controls for
general economic and industry-specific conditions to isolate
their effects on firm failures.203 Recognizing that conditions
leading to corporate failure take shape over time, the study
collects data on whether the companies in each pair combine or
separate their CEO and Chair positions during the five-year
period prior to the failure of the failed company in the pair.204
The study finds that when comparing the two sample
groups—companies that failed and companies that did not
fail—there are not statistically significant differences in
whether these companies separated or combined their CEO
and Chair positions.205 Data collected for the sample period
show that in each of the five years, between ten and twelve of
the twenty-one companies that eventually failed had separated
their CEO and Chair positions.206 Similarly, for the twenty-one
comparable companies that did not fail, between nine and
twelve companies had separated their CEO and Chair
positions.207 Acknowledging the limited focus of the study on a
small number of companies in the retailing industry, the
researchers conclude that duality is “not likely to make a
difference to the chances of corporate failure.”208
Donaldson and Davis (1991). This study analyzes the
financial performance of 321 companies, including large
Fortune 500 companies and smaller corporations in seven
different industries.209 Of the sample group, 76% of the
companies had a combined CEO-Chair structure, and 24% of
the companies had different individuals serve in the CEO and
Chair roles.210 The study compares the companies’ return on

201
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203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Id.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 409-10.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id. at 414.
Donaldson & Davis, supra note 62, at 54.
Id. at 54-55.
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equity and gain in shareholder wealth for the three years from
1985 to 1987.211
The study finds that the average return on equity was
14.75% for companies with a dual CEO-Chair and 11.49% for
companies with a separate Chair.212 The study considers this
difference in return on equity as statistically significant.213
Controlling for industry effects, the study also finds that the
dual CEO-Chair structure was associated with higher levels of
average return on equity than the separate Chair structure,
although the difference was reduced to 2.38%.214 Data from the
study show no statistically significant difference, with and
without controlling for industry effects, between the gain in
shareholder wealth of corporations that combined the CEOChair positions and corporations that separated these roles.215
Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996). Several researchers,
using a sample of 181 Fortune 500 companies and a five-year
sample period from 1986 to 1991, focus their study on the
financial performance of companies that changed their
governance structure to or from duality, as well as the longterm financial performance of companies that consistently
maintained either of the governance structures.216 The
researchers categorize the sample companies in three groups:
111 companies (61.3%) had combined roles over the entire
sample period, 12 companies (6.6%) had separate CEO and
Chair positions over the entire sample period, and 58
companies (32%) changed their leadership structure to or away
from duality during the sample period.217 The researchers
compare the effects on stock price following an announcement
of change in governance structure, changes in return on
common equity (“ROE”) and return on total assets (“ROA”)
following a change in governance structure, and the industry-

211

Id. at 55. Return on equity is “profit generated on shareholder funds,” and
gains in shareholder wealth include “the capital gains from share price appreciation
plus dividends, for holding the share for three years from 1985 . . . expressed relative to
the initial price . . . paid to acquire the stock in 1985.” Id.
212
Id. at 56.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 58.
216
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 44-45.
217
Id. at 45. Another study of 671 companies finds that ninety-four of that
study’s sample group (14%) changed their leadership structure by combining or
separating the CEO and Chair positions during the two-year period from 1978 to 1980.
Harrison et al., supra note 1, at 211, 216, 226.
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adjusted market value added ratios (“MVA”) during the fiveyear sample period for all three groups of companies.218
Results from this study reveal no significant effect on
stock price upon announcement of a change in leadership
structure, whether from duality to nonduality or from
nonduality to duality.219 The study also finds no measurable
effect on ROE or ROA in the two-year period following a change
in governance structure, whether from duality to nonduality or
from nonduality to duality.220 Similarly, when comparing the
long-term performance of companies that maintained duality or
nonduality over the entire test period, the study finds no
significant evidence that duality affects financial performance,
as measured by MVA.221 Pointing to the lack of any significant
difference in financial performance due to a status change
toward or away from duality, and no significant difference in
long-term financial performance between companies that had
CEO-Chairs and companies that had nonexecutive Chairs, the
researchers conclude that the call to abolish duality is more of
a “symbolic way of ‘signaling’ that the board is effectively
exercising its governance role . . . than an effective way of
motivating fundamental changes in firm performance.”222
Brickley, Coles, and Jarell (1997). This study focuses on
the impact of duality on the stock returns and return on capital
of 628 large U.S. companies contained in the 1988 Forbes
survey of corporate executives.223 Of this group, 535 companies
218

Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 44. Market value added ratio is “an
approximation of Tobin’s Q ratio” and is calculated as “the market value of debt,
preferred equity and common equity capitalization less the book value of a firm’s entire
capitalization, adjusted for past write-offs of capital.” Id. at 48. For comparative
purposes, a higher MVA reflects better operating performance. Id.
219
Id. at 46-47.
220
Id. at 47.
221
Id. at 49-50. Although the study’s results indicate that companies that
change their leadership structure have higher changes in market value added ratios,
the researchers note that the changes typically involve changing from nonduality to
duality and thus the resulting changes in market value added ratios for these
companies may not reflect the impact of duality on firm performance but instead may
reflect a “passing the baton” process whereby CEOs who have demonstrated their
ability are awarded the additional title of board chair. Id. at 50. Accord Brinkley et al.,
supra note 25.
222
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 51.
223
Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 197-98, 202 tbl.4 (the survey contains data
on 661 firms, but in calculating statistics pertinent to this article, thirty-three firms
are eliminated from the original sample due to a lack of a board chairperson). Return
on capital is “income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus
interest and minority interest (income account) all divided by invested capital (total) at
end of prior fiscal year.” Id. at 210 tbl.9.
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(85%) had CEO-Chairs, and 93 companies (15%) had CEOs who
did not serve as board Chairs.224
Results from the study show that for the year 1988,
companies that combined their leadership positions had a 6.5%
higher median stock return225 and a 3.5% higher median
industry-adjusted stock return.226 Although companies that
combined their CEO and Chair positions also had a 1.4%
higher median return on capital in the year 1988,227 companies
that separated their CEO and Chair positions had a 1.2%
higher median industry-adjusted return on capital.228
For the period from 1989 to 1991, while companies with
a CEO-Chair had a 4.4% higher annualized median stock
return,229 companies with a separate Chair had a 1.6% higher
annualized median industry-adjusted stock return.230 The study
finds similar results for return on capital during this period,
whereby companies with a combined CEO-Chair had a 0.2%
higher annualized median return on capital,231 but companies
with a separate Chair had a 2.4% higher annualized median
industry-adjusted return on capital.232
Based on these mixed findings, the study concludes that
companies that have one individual serving as both CEO and
board Chair “do not necessarily have lower accounting returns”
than companies that have two individuals occupy the separate
CEO and Chair positions.233 Moreover, because the researchers
224

Id. at 198 tbl.1 (statistics that appear in table 1 were altered to reflect a
sample size of 628 firms rather than the 661 firms used to calculate the statistics
therein).
225
See id. at 210 (comparing 1988 median stock return of 10.6% for companies
with separate leaders and 17.1% for companies with combined leaders).
226
See id. (comparing 1988 median industry-adjusted stock return of -2.5% for
companies with separate leaders and 1.0% for companies with combined leaders).
Industry benchmarks come from companies with the same four-digit SIC code. Id.
227
See id. (comparing 1988 median return on capital of 13.8% for companies
with separate leaders and 15.2% for companies with combined leaders).
228
See id. (comparing 1988 median industry-adjusted return on capital of 2.4%
for companies with separate leaders and 1.2% for companies with combined leaders).
229
See id. (comparing 1989-1991 annualized median stock return of 9.1% for
companies with separate leaders and 13.5% for companies with combined leaders).
230
See id. (comparing 1989-1991 annualized median industry-adjusted stock
return of 4.0% for companies with separate leaders and 2.4% for companies with
combined leaders).
231
See id. (comparing 1989-1991 annualized median return on capital of
12.4% for companies with separate leaders and 12.6% for companies with combined
leaders).
232
See id. (comparing 1989-1991 annualized median industry-adjusted return
on capital of 2.7% for companies with separate leaders and 0.3% for companies with
combined leaders).
233
Id. at 211.
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recognize that the results reflect conflicting and mostly
insignificant differences in stock return and return on capital,
they urge caution in using the study’s findings to draw
conclusions about the effect of duality on corporate financial
profitability.234
B.

Evidence Supporting Separate Positions
1. Nonfinancial Measures of Corporate Performance

Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis (1988). This study
analyzes the turnover rates for the CEO and Chair positions of
671 large public manufacturing companies.235 Of this sample,
72% of the companies consolidated the top leadership positions
so that one individual held both the CEO and Chair positions.236
The study determines turnover by examining whether the
person who held the position in 1978 remained in the same
position in 1980.237 Results from this study show that the
turnover rate for CEOs who held only one position was 15%,
whereas the turnover rate for CEOs who also held the position
of board Chair was only 10%.238
Other empirical studies that focus on CEO turnover in
poorly performing companies also find that it is difficult to
remove an underperforming CEO if that CEO also holds the
position of board Chair.239 The consistent finding from studies
on CEO turnover is that when the same individual holds both
the CEO and Chair positions, the likelihood of the board
dismissing the CEO decreases.240
Mallette and Fowler (1992). This study compares the
adoption of poison pills by companies that have a dual CEOChair leadership structure and companies that have a separate

234

Id. at 210-11.
Harrison et al., supra note 1, at 216.
236
Id. at 215-16. Names of individuals holding the CEO and Chair positions
come from the Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives
for 1979 and 1981. Id. at 217.
237
Id. at 217.
238
Id. at 222. The 10% represents the data for CEO-Chairs who retain neither
position during the test period. Id.
239
See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 2, 7 (citing Weisbach’s study in
1988 and Goyal and Park’s study in 2002).
240
See Cannella & Lubatkin, supra note 136, at 782 (explaining the study’s
finding that the “likelihood of dismissal is also higher for incumbent CEOs who do not
hold the chairperson title”).
235
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Chair.241 The sample population includes 673 industrial
manufacturing companies, and the study period covers the
peak poison pill adoption years of 1985 to 1988.242 Of the sample
group, 477 companies (71%) had a combined CEO-Chair and
196 companies (29%) had a separate Chair.243
The study finds that 226 companies (34%) of the sample
population had adopted poison pills by the end of 1988, and 447
companies (66%) of the sample population did not have poison
pills in place at the end of 1988.244 Results of the study show
that a company with a nonexecutive Chair was much less likely
to adopt a poison pill than a company with a dual CEO-Chair.245
Of the 226 companies that adopted poison pills during the peak
years of poison pill adoption, 200 companies (88%) were led by
a CEO-Chair, and only 26 companies (12%) were led by a
nonexecutive Chair.246 Although this study focuses only on the
empirical association between duality and adoption of poison
pills, the study cites other research that shows poison pills to
have a negative effect on stock price.247 Thus, the study
concludes that a company with a combined CEO-Chair is much
more likely to adopt a poison pill, a defensive measure that has
been shown by other studies to have the effect of discouraging
or deterring takeover bids and resulting in a decrease in
shareholder value.248
Brickley, Coles, and Jarell (1997). This study compares
the amount of compensation and the length of tenure of CEOChairs and of CEOs who do not serve as Chairs.249 The study’s
sample population includes 628 companies contained in the
241

Mallette & Fowler, supra note 3, at 1010.
Id. at 1020-21.
243
Id. at 1022.
244
Id. at 1021.
245
Id. at 1023. Accord Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082 (citing,
with approval, the Mallette & Fowler study’s finding of a positive correlation between
duality and adoption of poison pills). Other research also shows that a board led by a
CEO-Chair is more likely to adopt poison pills and to resist takeover bids. See, e.g.,
Boyd, supra note 31, at 302 (noting that signs of CEO-Chairs’ ineffective governance
include resistance to hostile takeovers and adoption of poison pills).
246
Mallette & Fowler, supra note 3, at 1023.
247
Id. at 1011. See Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 439 (explaining that
empirical studies show that a company’s stock price drops significantly upon the board’s
announcement of the adoption of a poison pill, while the stock price rises upon the board’s
announcement that the company has abandoned its plan to adopt a poison pill).
248
Mallette & Fowler, supra note 3, at 1028. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 612-14 (2002) (discussing the evidence that hostile
takeovers result in increased shareholder wealth).
249
See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 202 tbl.4 (presenting data on tenure
and compensation classified by whether the CEO and Chair positions are combined).
242
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1988 Forbes survey of corporate executives.250 Of this group, 535
companies (85%) had CEO-Chairs, and 93 companies (15%) had
CEOs who did not serve as board Chairs.251
The study finds that both the compensation and tenure
of the 535 CEO-Chairs were markedly higher than the
compensation and tenure of the 93 CEOs who did not serve as
board Chairs.252 Data from the study show that the median total
compensation for CEOs who also served as board Chairs was
approximately 46% higher than the median total compensation
for CEOs who did not serve as board Chair.253 Similarly,
whereas the median tenure for CEOs who also served as board
Chairs was 6.92 years, the median tenure for CEOs who did
not serve as board Chairs was only 2.92 years.254
The study’s findings of higher compensation and longer
tenure for the CEO-Chairs may be indicators of managerial
entrenchment in the duality governance structure.255 By
combining the top two leadership positions in one person,
executive accountability is reduced, discharge for poor
management performance is doubtful, and the combined leader
is more likely to be able to extract additional compensation and
stay in power longer than a CEO who has to answer to a
separate board Chair.256
A recent study by professors and researchers Bebchuk,
Cremers, and Peyer provides further empirical evidence that
combining the CEO and Chair positions may facilitate
managerial entrenchment.257 Their study, in addition to
providing evidence of entrenchment, also provides data on the
250

Id. at 197, 198 tbl.1 (the survey contained data on 661 firms, but in
calculating the statistics pertinent to this article, thirty-three firms were eliminated
from the original sample due to a lack of a board chairperson).
251
Id. at 198 tbl.1 (statistics that appear in table 1 were altered to reflect a
sample size of 628 firms rather than the 661 firms used to calculate the statistics
therein).
252
Id. at 202 tbl.4.
253
See id. (comparing a median of $675,000 in total compensation for CEOs
and a median of $985,000 in total compensation for CEO-Chairs). Total compensation
includes “salary, bonus, value of restricted stock, savings and thrift plans, and other
benefits.” Id. at tbl.4. A potential cost of separating the CEO and Chair positions is the
compensation for the independent chairperson. Id. at 195. See Brown, supra note 30, at
1105 (explaining that directors who are also employees of the corporation generally do
not receive additional compensation for their service on the board).
254
Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 202 tbl.4.
255
Id. at 202.
256
See id. (acknowledging that tenure and compensation data for CEO-Chairs
indicate that “combined titles might imply that the CEO is not accountable to
shareholders and is seldom fired for poor performance”).
257
See infra Part IV.B.2.
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financial performance of companies that are led by dominant
chief executives such as CEOs who also serve as board
Chairs.258
Sanders and Carpenter (1998). This study analyzes the
correlation between a company’s degree of internationalization
and the likelihood that the company would combine its CEO
and Chair positions.259 The study presents information that
shows directors and officers of international firms operate in
highly complex information processing and decision-making
environments due to diverse cultural and competitive
conditions.260 In addition, internationalization presents greater
information processing requirements and monitoring problems
because of the geographic dispersion of assets, operations,
personnel, and management.261 International companies strive
to control and cope with this informational and decisionmaking complexity by creating a governance structure that
efficiently processes information and effectively monitors
executive actions.262
The study hypothesizes that as a company’s degree of
internationalization increases, the likelihood decreases that the
company would have a dual CEO-Chair governance structure.263
The sample population includes 258 companies in the 1992
Standard & Poor’s 500.264 A company’s degree of
internationalization was measured by its foreign sales, foreign
production, and geographic dispersion.265
The study’s findings indicate that the degree of a
company’s internationalization is a significant predictor of
whether the company has the same person or two individuals
serve in the CEO and Chair positions.266 Results from the study
258

This article discusses Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer’s empirical study in
more detail in Part IV.B.2, which analyzes the empirical evidence of financial benefits
arising from separating the CEO and Chair positions.
259
Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 158.
260
See id. at 158-60 (citing various studies).
261
Id. at 171-72.
262
See id. at 158-60 (citing various studies).
263
Id. at 164.
264
Id. at 165.
265
Id. at 166. Foreign sales are represented by “the ratio of foreign sales to
total sales and reflect a firm’s dependence on sales to foreign markets.” Id. Foreign
production is represented by “foreign assets expressed as a percentage of total assets,”
and geographic dispersion identifies the “number of countries in which a firm had
subsidiaries, expressed as a percentage of the highest number of countries with
subsidiaries represented in our sample.” Id.
266
Id. at 170.
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suggest
that
companies
with
high
degrees
of
internationalization are likely to implement a governance
structure that amplifies communication channels and disperses
responsibility
among
company
leaders;
the
highly
internationalized companies are not likely to consolidate power
and responsibility into one combined CEO-Chair.267 Instead,
these companies separate the CEO and Chair positions in order
to improve the information available to the board and to
enhance the board’s ability to control and monitor
management.268 The study concludes that separation of the CEO
and Chair positions may allow companies to cope with the high
information processing and agency costs that result from a
high level of internationalization.269
2. Financial Measures of Corporate Performance
Duality is often cited as a culprit of the decline in
financial performance of large corporations,270 while the
existence of a nonexecutive Chair is regarded as a reason for
the competitive financial performance of other large
corporations.271 For example, opponents of duality point to
General Motors’s loss of $23.5 billion in 1992, together with its
sizeable losses of market share and market value, as resulting
from then-CEO-Chairman Roger Smith’s constraint on board
oversight and restriction on board adoption of appropriate
strategies to adapt to the competitive environment.272
Another often cited anecdote about duality’s destruction
of shareholder value involves General Motors’s payment of
“greenmail”273 to Ross Perot, an outside director on General

267

Id. at 164, 169-73. See Berg & Smith, supra note 129, at 34 (“Unless some
divisionalization occurs to improve information flows, the costs of monitoring and
rewarding inputs (and activities) rise.”).
268
Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164, 169-73.
269
Id. at 172.
270
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; see also Boyd, supra note 31, at 301
(“[D]uality has been blamed for poor performance and slow response to change” in large
corporations.).
271
See, e.g., Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 43 (citing nonduality as the reason
Compaq was able to “make appropriate strategic responses to a changing competitive
environment”).
272
Id. at 42.
273
The corporate practice of paying a premium price to repurchase shares in
order to be rid of a hostile shareholder is known as paying “greenmail” to the hostile
shareholder. CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 244. Several empirical studies have
documented the association between greenmail payments and negative stock returns
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Motors’s board who was also a major shareholder of the
company and a vocal critic of General Motors’s management.274
Many criticized CEO-Chair Roger Smith for “muzzling” Ross
Perot’s criticism of management when the CEO-Chair directed
the company to buy out Perot’s shares at a premium price of
$700 million.275 Similarly, supporters of separating the top
leadership positions regard IBM’s loss of $5 billion in 1992,
together with its substantial losses of market share and market
value, as resulting from then-CEO-Chairman John Akers’s
restraint on the board’s exercise of its own judgment to
objectively evaluate management performance.276
To contrast with the poor financial performance of
General Motors and IBM under the duality leadership
structure, supporters of a separate Chair point to Compaq
Computer’s ability to perform competitively under the
leadership of Ben Rosen, a nonexecutive Chair.277 Compaq’s
board of directors, under the leadership of a separate Chair and
over the strong objection of the company’s CEO, adopted a
successful lower-priced product line to maintain its market
share and remain competitive in the industry.278 In addition to
these anecdotal cases linking duality with negative financial
performance, several studies present empirical evidence that
separating the CEO and Chair positions results in better
corporate financial performance.
Berg and Smith (1978). These researchers conducted
one of the first empirical studies that tested the impact of
duality on corporate financial performance.279 The sample
population includes the entire group of Fortune 200 companies
in twenty-three industries.280 Of the 200 companies in the
sample group, about 59% had one individual serving in both
the CEO and Chair roles, while approximately 41% had two
separate leaders in these positions.281 The performance
measures include stock price appreciation, return on equity,
for nonparticipating shareholders of the companies making the payments. Walsh &
Seward, supra note 21, at 439.
274
Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42-43.
275
Id. at 42-43.
276
Id.
277
Id. at 43.
278
Id.
279
Berg & Smith, supra note 129, at 34.
280
Id. at 35.
281
Id. at 38 tbl.II (Table II contains information for only 199 of the Fortune
200 companies; percentages are based on these 199 companies).
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and return on investment during the test period of 1974 to
1976.282
Results from this study show that companies that
combine their CEO and Chair positions experience significantly
lower stock price appreciation and return on equity, and a
modestly lower return on investment, than companies that
separate the CEO and Chair positions.283 These findings suggest
that companies that combine the CEO and Chair positions
perform worse financially than companies that have an
independent Chair.284
Rechner and Dalton (1989 and 1991). This study
examines the risk-adjusted stockholder return of 141 Fortune
500 companies that kept their governance structures constant,
either combining or separating the CEO and Chair positions,
over the six-year period from 1978 to 1983.285 Of the 141
companies in the sample group, 79% had one leader who served
in both the CEO and Chair roles, and 21% had two leaders in
these positions.286
The first analysis of data in 1989 finds no statistically
significant difference in risk-adjusted stockholder returns
between companies with a combined CEO-Chair and
companies with a separate Chair.287 The data show no
significant difference in risk-adjusted stockholder return for
any one single year of the sample period, and no significant
difference in stock return for the entire six-year period,

282

Id. at 35. Stock price appreciation is “the change in the value of common
stock,” return on equity is “(net income)/(stockholder equity),” and return on
investment is “(price appreciation and stock dividend)/(book value of equity).” Id. at 38
statistical appendix.
283
Id. at 39. The results as presented in Table A.1 on page 39 of the study,
and reported here in this article, differ from the researchers’ summary of the results as
discussed in the text on page 35 of the study. See id. at 35 (“For total return to
investors, the impact on performance was significant and negative . . . .”).
284
Cf. id. at 35 (“It would be premature to conclude that unitary leadership
reduces benefits to stockholders—although across all industries this was true for the
return on book value in equity. These mixed results suggest that no general conclusion
can be made, and further tests are called for.”).
285
Rechner & Dalton 1989 Study, supra note 190, at 142. The study specifies,
“Stockholder return . . . comprises risk-adjusted, abnormal returns on common stocks.
This approach takes into account the effects of both general market factors and
differential risk levels on security returns. Thus, the measure reflects only those
returns due to firm-specific factors.” Id.
286
Paula L. Rechner & Dan R. Dalton, CEO Duality and Organizational
Performance: A Longitudinal Analysis, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 155, 156 (1991)
[hereinafter Rechner & Dalton 1991 Study].
287
Rechner & Dalton 1989 Study, supra note 190, at 142.
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between companies that had a combined CEO-Chair and
companies that had a separate Chair.288
When the researchers conducted a subsequent analysis
of the same 141 companies over the same six-year period from
1978 to 1983, focusing their research on the companies’ return
on equity, return on investment, and profit margin, the results
showed a negative relationship between duality and these
performance measures.289 In these three financial measures of
corporate performance, the companies that had two individuals
serving in the CEO and Chair positions consistently and
significantly outperformed companies that had one individual
occupying both roles.290
Pi and Timme (1993). This study investigates the
variation in return on assets and production cost efficiency
between companies that had one dual CEO-Chair and
companies that had two individuals serve in these roles.291 The
study focuses on a sample of 112 publicly traded bank-holding
companies for the period from 1987 to 1990.292 Of the sample
population, 93 banks (83%) had a combined CEO-Chair, and 19
banks (17%) had a separate Chair.293
Controlling for company size and other variables, the
study’s results show that companies that had a separate Chair
consistently and significantly outperformed companies that
had a combined CEO-Chair in both measures of return on
assets and production cost efficiency.294 From these results, the
researchers suggest that the board’s monitoring function is not
effective in a duality governance structure, with the
consequence that the CEO-Chair may be less constrained from
engaging in behavior that destroys shareholder value.295
Boyd (1995). This study gathers data on leadership
structure and financial performance of 192 public companies in
twelve industries.296 The number of sample companies in each
288

Id.
Rechner & Dalton 1991 Study, supra note 286, at 156-59.
290
Id. at 157.
291
Lynn Pi & Stephen G. Timme, Corporate Control and Bank Efficiency, 17
J. BANKING & FIN. 515, 518 (1993). Return on assets is “after-tax net income divided by
total assets,” and production cost efficiency is “derived [using] a stochastic frontier cost
model” that examines each company’s costs, outputs, and prices. Id.
292
Id. at 517, 521.
293
Id.
294
Id. at 525-26.
295
Id.
296
Boyd, supra note 31, at 306.
289
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industry ranges from twelve to twenty-two, and the percentage
of sample companies with duality in each industry ranges from
33% to 73%.297 Financial performance is measured as the
average return on investment over the five-year period from
1980 through 1984.298 The study results show that the effect of
duality on financial performance varies across industry groups,
but that combining the CEO and Chair positions is correlated
with slightly lower corporate financial performance as
measured by return on investment.299
This study also includes a meta-analysis of the findings
of seven other empirical studies published during the period
from 1978 to 1993.300 In these seven studies, the sample
population ranges from 42 to 800 companies.301 The seven
studies focus on measures of financial performance, such as
return on equity, return on investment, stock return, and profit
margin.302 When aggregating the result statistics across these
seven studies, the meta-analysis shows that separation of the
CEO and Chair positions is associated with slightly higher
financial performance across the aggregated financial
performance measures.303
Sundaramurthy, Mahoney, and Mahoney (1997). This
study examines the relationship between board structure and
stock market reaction to the company’s adoption of
antitakeover provisions.304 The sample population includes 261
companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 that adopted 486
antitakeover measures from 1984 to 1988, the crest of the
takeover wave.305 The results show that “the market reacts less
negatively to antitakeover provisions adopted by boards with a
chairperson who is not the CEO than to antitakeover
297

Id. at 308. The smaller percentages of duality for some industries reflect
the study’s inclusion of smaller companies, where duality is not as common as in larger
companies. Id. at 307.
298
Id.
299
Id. at 308-09.
300
Id. at 302. The seven studies were conducted by Berg and Smith (1978);
Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma (1985); Rechner and Dalton (1989 and 1991);
Donaldson and Davis (1991); Mallette and Fowler (1992); and Cannella and Lubatkin
(1993). Id.
301
Id. at 303.
302
Id. at 302-03.
303
Id. at 302.
304
Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 231.
305
Id. at 234. The antitakeover provisions include supermajority voting for
mergers, classified board, fair price provisions, reduction of cumulative voting, antigreenmail provisions, and poison pills. Id. at 244-45.
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provisions adopted by boards chaired by the CEO.”306 The
researchers conclude that market reaction appears to be
influenced by the leadership structure of the board and that
investors regard a nonexecutive Chair as more capable of
monitoring management actions and protecting shareholder
interests than a combined CEO-Chair.307
The study also finds that “the market reacts more
negatively to antitakeover provisions adopted by outsiderdominated boards than to antitakeover provisions adopted by
boards” that are dominated by insiders.308 Thus, while the
market views an outsider Chair as enhancing the ability of the
board to monitor and protect shareholder interests, investors
do not perceive the same value in other outside directors.309
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2007). This study focuses
on the relationship between CEO centrality and the value and
behavior of public firms.310 Data for the study cover 12,011
companies in twelve industries for the years 1993 through
2004.311 The study refers to CEO centrality as the relative
importance of the CEO to other top executives within the
company in terms of ability, contribution, or power.312 CEO
centrality is measured by the “CEO’s pay slice (CPS),” which is
the CEO’s compensation as a percentage of the aggregate topfive compensations in the company.313 CPS is deemed to be the
product of several variables relating to corporate governance,
including whether the CEO also has the dual role as board
Chair.314
Results from the study show that greater CEO
centrality, or higher CPS, relates to firm performance in
several ways, including lower firm value as measured by
306

Id. at 239.
Id. at 239-40. The study’s suggestion—that investor trust in the board’s
monitoring role is enhanced when companies separate the CEO and Chair positions—is
consistent with research findings that corporate boards that are led by a nonexecutive
Chair tend to be sued less often. Id. at 240.
308
Id.
309
See id. (“[T]he market not only does not take into account the monitoring
role of outsiders but actually discounts their presence.”).
310
See generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 78, at 1-5 (concluding that CEO
centrality is an aspect of corporate governance that merits attention from researchers).
311
Id. at 8.
312
Id. at 1, 6.
313
Id. Executive compensation includes “the total compensation to each
executive, including salary, bonus, other annual pay, the total value of restricted stock
granted that year, the Black-Scholes value of stock options granted that year, longterm incentive payouts, and all other total compensation.” Id. at 7.
314
Id. at 1.
307
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industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q,315 lower industry-adjusted return
on assets,316 lower stock returns accompanying acquisition
announcements,317 and lower CEO turnover controlling for
length of service and performance.318 The study finds that the
high CPS level may be the result of a CEO who uses his power
to dominate the board and the company’s decision making and
to raise his CPS above an optimal level.319 Results from the
study also rule out the hypothesis that the correlation between
high CPS and low firm value is explained by the tendency of
low value companies to adopt high levels of CPS.320 Thus, the
researchers explain, “having a high excess CPS might reflect
agency and governance problems that in turn bring about a
reduction in firm value.”321
From this study, one may expect that, because high
CEO centrality is associated with low firm value, a CEO who
gets high CPS but achieves low financial value for the company
is likely to be removed, as the board is likely to be dissatisfied
with a highly compensated CEO who fails to create high value
for the company.322 Contrary to expectation, however, the study
finds that the association between high CPS and low firm value
is most prominent in companies with high entrenchment—
companies where the CEO is “relatively insulated from market
discipline and the threat of removal.”323 The study’s results
indicate that the more dominant a CEO is within a company’s
governance structure, the less impact market performance has

315

Id. at 1, 3, 11. Tobin’s Q is “the market value of equity plus the book value
of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets.” Id. at
8, 40, 41, 46, 49.
316
Id. at 1, 3. Industry-adjusted return on assets is “the return on assets
computed as net income divided by book value of assets adjusted by the median ROA of
the firms in Compustat in a given four-digit SIC industry and year.” Id. at 8-9, 40.
317
Id. at 1, 3. The study finds that “high-CPS firms tend to make worse
acquisition decisions as judged by the market’s reaction to acquisition announcements.
If the acquiring firm has higher CPS, the stock return accompanying the acquisition
announcement is lower and more likely to be negative.” Id. at 3. The researchers
concluded that “one potential reason for the lower valuation of firms with high CPS is
that high-CPS firms make acquisitions viewed less favorably by the market and, in
particular, are more likely to make acquisitions viewed as value-destroying by the
market.” Id. at 26.
318
Id. at 4.
319
Id. at 2, 10, 13.
320
Id. at 2.
321
Id.
322
See id. at 20 (discussing whether CEO turnover is related to CPS).
323
Id. at 21.
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on that CEO’s tenure.324 Based on these findings, the
researchers suggest that the CEO’s dominance, of which
duality may be a contributing factor,325 exaggerates agency
problems that may lower the financial performance of the
company and may make the removal and replacement of the
CEO more difficult or unlikely.326
Balsam and Upadhyay (2009). This recent study
examines the impact that duality—and the announcement that
the company is moving toward or away from duality—has on
corporate financial performance.327 The study’s sample
population includes the 1,500 companies in the ExecuComp
database of companies during the ten-year period from 1996 to
2005.328 The percentage of companies in the sample population
that had a separate Chair ranged from 24% in 1996 to almost
40% in 2005.329
Results from the study show that separating the CEO
and board Chair positions correlates with significantly
improved financial performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q,
return on assets, and ratio of sales to assets.330 The study also
finds that, at times, appointment of a lead director has no effect
and, at other times, has a negative effect on these three
measures of corporate financial performance.331 Thus, the
researchers conclude “that having a lead director is not a
substitute for having a separate chair.”332
The study also examines the stock market reaction to
the 408 announcements of a change in leadership structure
made by the companies during the ten-year sample period.333 Of
the group of announcements, 236 (58%) announced a move
away from duality in that the combined CEO and Chair
324

See id. at 30 (concluding that “CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm
specific returns for CEOs with a high industry-adjusted CPS”).
325
Id. at 6.
326
Id. at 29.
327
Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 3, 6.
328
Id. at 12, 38 tbl.1. The study includes one analysis that excludes utilities
and financial services firms, and another analysis that includes utilities and financial
services firms; both analyses yield similar results. Id. at 12 n.11.
329
Id. at 15-16.
330
Id. at 4-6, 18-19, 21. Tobin’s Q is measured as “(Market value of equity +
Book value of debt)/(Book value of assets).” Id. at 13.
331
Id. at 4-6, 18, 21.
332
Id. at 32.
333
Id. at 29. The study excludes announcements that were accompanied by
other material events such as “mergers, dividend declaration, splits, tender offers, new
product announcements, charter amendments or substantial changes in capital
structure.” Id.
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positions were being separated, and 172 (42%) announced a
move toward duality in that the separated positions were being
combined.334 The study’s results show positive stock market
returns are more likely to follow the announcement of a
decision to separate the CEO and Chair positions than the
announcement of a decision to combine the positions.335
C.

Weighing the Empirical Evidence

Much of the empirical evidence on both the financial
and nonfinancial effects of duality weighs in favor of separating
the positions of CEO and Chair. Although the studies use
different measures of corporate performance—some studies
focusing only on large companies or specific industries, and
some studies employing no control for other governance
variables—when viewed together, they provide a convincing
case that separating the CEO and Chair positions has a
positive impact on corporate performance from both financial
and nonfinancial perspectives.
Although grouped under Part IV.A as “Evidence
Supporting Combined Positions,” the studies discussed in that
section do not provide much empirical evidence that duality
results in improved financial or nonfinancial performance—
only that duality does not result in worse performance. With
the exception of the Donaldson study in 1991, the studies in
Part IV.A find that there is no difference in performance
between companies that have a combined CEO-Chair and those
that have a separate Chair. The Donaldson study finds that
only return on equity is higher in dual CEO-Chair companies
than in companies with a separate Chair, and that there is no
difference between the two groups of companies with respect to
gain in shareholder wealth.336 All other studies in that section
find no difference between companies that have a combined
CEO-Chair and those that have a separate Chair with respect
to involvement in illegal activities, bankruptcy filings, stock
returns, return on equity, return on assets, return on capital,
and market value added. Lacking the positive evidence to
334

Id. It should be noted the original sample size was comprised of 512
announcements, 104 of which were lost “due to incomplete returns on data.” Id.
335
Id. at 6, 29-30. Stock market returns include abnormal return, which is
“computed after subtracting predicted from realized stock returns,” and excess return,
which is “computed after subtracting the return on the value-weighted market index
from the firm’s realized return.” Id. at 30.
336
Donaldson & Davis, supra note 62, at 56-58.
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advocate affirmatively for the combined CEO-Chair structure,
the studies only defensively protect duality in concluding that
companies with a combined CEO-Chair are “no more likely” to
underperform on nonfinancial measures337 and “do not
necessarily” have lower financial returns than companies with
a separate Chair.338
The studies identified in Part IV.B as “Evidence
Supporting Separate Positions” provide strong data that
companies with nonduality perform better in both financial and
nonfinancial metrics than companies with one individual
occupying both roles. Several studies focus on the effect of
duality on entrenchment indicators such as the adoption of
antitakeover provisions, rates of CEO turnover, lengths of CEO
tenure, and amounts of CEO compensation; data from these
studies suggest that combining the CEO and Chair positions
may increase the likelihood of entrenchment. For example,
companies with a combined CEO-Chair are much more likely to
adopt poison pills339 and less likely to oust a nonperforming
CEO.340 Study results also indicate that the CEO-Chairs receive
markedly higher compensation and longer tenure than the
CEOs who do not also serve as the Chair.341 In addition, the
studies—covering over 12,000 companies in more than twenty
industries—provide compelling evidence that companies with a
separate board Chair perform significantly better on financial
measures such as stock returns, return on equity, return on
assets, return on investment, and profit margin.
The stock market also appears to favor the separation of
the CEO and Chair positions. Results from several studies
suggest that investors perceive companies that separate the
positions to be better monitors of management and better
advocates of shareholders than companies that combine the
two positions. Thus, companies that announce they are
separating the CEO-Chair structure experience significantly
more positive stock returns than companies that announce they
are combining the CEO and Chair positions.342 In addition, the
market reacts less negatively to antitakeover provisions

337
338
339
340
341
342

Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 796; see also Chaganti et al., supra note 200, at 414.
Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 211; see also Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 46-51.
Mallette & Fowler, supra note 3, at 1023.
Cannella & Lubatkin, supra note 136, at 782; Harrison et al., supra note 1, at 222.
Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 202.
Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 6, 30.
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adopted by a board with a separate Chair than to those
measures adopted by a board with a combined CEO-Chair.343
The empirical evidence indicates not only that duality
correlates with lower corporate performance and shareholder
value, but also that the negative effects of duality cannot be
eliminated simply by putting more outside directors on the
board or by installing a lead director.344 It appears that the
board Chair occupies a powerful and influential position in the
corporate governance structure and that this individual’s
independence from management is pivotal to the company’s
performance.345 Thus, having a nonexecutive Chair appears to
be more crucial than having a lead director or an outsiderdominated board in reducing agency costs and enhancing
shareholder value.346
V.

STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEWS ON DUALITY

The board is charged with management and monitoring
responsibilities in order to serve the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders, but directors may also
consider the interests of other stakeholders when making
corporate decisions.347 The term “stakeholders” includes, in
addition to shareholders, the corporation’s employees,

343

Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 237-40.
See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 4-6, 18-19, 21 (finding that
although separation of the CEO and Chair positions correlates with higher financial
performance, appointment of a lead director does not correlate with better financial
results); Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 237-40 (finding that although the
market reacts less negatively to antitakeover provisions adopted by boards with a
separate Chair than to provisions adopted by boards with a CEO-Chair, the “market
reacts more negatively to anti-takeover provisions adopted by outsider-dominated
boards than to antitakeover provisions adopted by boards with fewer outsiders.”).
345
See Clark, supra note 5, at 271 (explaining that some corporate governance
experts urge companies to have a substantial minority of insiders on the board but
insist that the board chair be an outside director); MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32,
at 9 (“[T]he ‘chairman of the board’ title is not meaningless; it remains a strong
hierarchical signal of board leadership to fellow board members, management and
shareowners alike.”); Ramirez, supra note 59, at 377 (“[T]here is powerful evidence that
the separation of CEO and chairman of the board into two positions reduces agency
costs and enhances firm value.”).
346
See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 32 (“[H]aving a lead director is
not a substitute for having a separate chair.”); MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 8
(“The lead director is better than nothing. But on a scale of 1 to 10, having a [nonexecutive] chairman is 10, and having a lead director is about a 4.”); Sundaramurthy et
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customers, and creditors; “stakeholders” may also include the
community and environment in which the corporation
operates.348 The term has been defined even more broadly to
include “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by
the achievement of the organization’s objectives.”349 Based on
that broad definition, the list of stakeholders may be expanded
to include “governments, competitors, consumer advocates,
environmentalists, special interest groups, and the media.”350
Executives and boards of directors of companies that
have a dual CEO-Chair governance structure naturally oppose
splitting the leadership positions.351 Some candidates for the
CEO position in fact demand that they get the chairman’s seat
along with the top executive spot.352 Reasons for opposing
separation of the roles focus on the desire to have only one
person in charge of the company. These reasons include
preventing dilution of the CEO’s power to effectively lead the
company, avoiding potential rivalry between the CEO and the
Chair, and eliminating potential confusion about who is
responsible for the company’s performance.353 As explained by
an executive who supports combining the CEO and Chair
positions, “They should be the same person. If they are not, the
Chairman would be a figure-head or would usurp the role of
the CEO.”354
Directors of companies that have a nonexecutive Chair,
on the other hand, have expressed strong support for splitting
the position.355 The 2008 Public Company Governance Survey
348

Licht, supra note 28, at 651.
See id. at 722 (quoting R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A
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Caggiano, supra note 51, at 5; Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, CEO
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ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVES 11, 11 (1997); MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 20;
Worrell et al., supra note 18, at 499. See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 54
(referencing the Exxon Mobil board’s recommendation that shareholders vote against a
shareholder proposal to separate the CEO and Chair positions); Millstein & MacAvoy,
supra note 30, at 1287 n.18 (noting that opposition to separation of the roles originates
from management groups, including The Business Roundtable, a group of chief
executives from large public companies).
352
Caggiano, supra note 51, at 5. See Lublin, supra note 57 (recounting
Edward Breen’s desire for both the CEO and Chairman jobs at Tyco International).
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conducted by the National Association of Corporate Directors
shows that 72.8% of the directors serving on boards with a
separate Chair believe that there is great benefit from splitting
the CEO and Chair positions, while only 6.7% of the directors
do not perceive a benefit from separating the roles.356
Business leaders have also expressed concern about
duality and have voiced their support for the nonexecutive
Chair role. Harold Geneen, former chairman of International
Telephone & Telegraph, believes that the board’s role is to
judge the performance of the company’s management,
especially the CEO.357 Mr. Geneen opposes duality on the basis
that the CEO, as the chief professional manager for the
company, should not also assume the leadership position on the
board because the CEO “cannot represent the shareholders and
impartially sit in judgment on himself.”358 Similarly, Carl Icahn,
a prominent financier, views the weakness in board oversight
as a contributing factor to the recent economic crisis, and one of
his suggestions for board reform is to separate the roles of the
CEO and the board Chair.359 Compaq Computer’s former
chairman, Benjamin Rosen, opines that when the CEO also
serves as the board Chair, “[c]hecks and balances have been
thrown to the wind.”360 Robert Monks, a venture capitalist and a
director of numerous public companies, states it even more
harshly: “You’re really talking about, when you have a
combined chairman and C.E.O., a dictatorship.”361
Many shareholders have voiced their preference for
splitting the top leadership positions. Mutual funds, pension
funds, other institutional shareholders, and shareholder
activists have frequently lobbied for companies to adopt and
implement governance policies that separate the positions of
CEO and board Chair.362 For example, the United Shareholders’
Association, the New York City Employees Retirement System,
Ram Trust Services, and the California Public Employees’
Retirement System have submitted shareholder proposals to
356
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urge the boards of directors of large public companies, such as
General Motors, Sears, and Exxon-Mobil, to require that an
outside director serve as the chairperson of the board.363 These
shareholders view the separation of the CEO and Chair
positions as a good governance practice that signals the board’s
ability and willingness to control management and protect
shareholder interests.364
Shareholder proposals to split the CEO and Chair
positions have received increasing support from shareholders
in recent years, and although nonbinding on the board of
directors, these shareholder resolutions have been successful in
pressuring some companies to split the positions.365 At
Washington Mutual, for example, the board of directors decided
in 2008 to replace CEO Kerry Killinger as chairman of the
board in response to a majority vote by shareholders to
separate the positions.366 Similarly, at Bank of America, CEO
Kenneth Lewis relinquished his role as board Chair in mid2009 after a majority of the company’s shareholders voted in
favor of splitting the positions.367 Later that year, CEO John
Mackey stepped down as Chair of Whole Foods Market after
363
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years of pressure from shareholders to separate the roles of the
chief executive and the board chair.368
Various industry groups are supportive of splitting the
top corporate leadership positions. The National Association of
Corporate Directors (“NACD”), for example, identifies that one
of the membership’s Key Agreed Principles to Strengthen
Corporate Governance for U.S. Publicly Traded Companies is
that corporate governance should be structured to provide
leadership for the management group that is distinct from
leadership for the board.369 The NACD’s guidelines for the
composition of its own board of directors also specify that the
“positions of Chairman of the Board and CEO are separate,”
the “CEO may not serve as Chairman,” and the “Chairman of
the Board shall be an independent Director.”370 Other
organizations that have voiced their support for separating the
top leadership roles include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,371 the Council of Institutional
Investors,372 and the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance
and Performance.373
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Corporate governance advisers and rating services
regard the nonexecutive Chair structure as a better governance
structure than the CEO-Chair structure.374 These advisers and
services provide corporate governance ratings to various
customers, including “investors, insurance companies, financial
and securities analysts . . . , financial institutions, and the
rated companies themselves.”375 Customers use the ratings “to
make investment decisions . . ., determine premiums, prepare
financial and stock reports . . ., determine credit risks, and
benchmark governance practices.”376 Citing the enhanced ability
of a nonexecutive Chair to monitor management’s performance,
the governance raters assign strong grades to companies that
separate their CEO and Chair positions.377
Regulators have expressed support for board reforms
that restrict the company’s CEO from serving as board Chair.378
Current and former commissioners of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission have spoken in favor of separating the
positions as a means of reducing the power of the chief
executive over the board.379 Regulators believe that the
separation of the roles would strengthen the governance of U.S.
corporations because the CEO’s role is to lead the management
group and serve as its spokesperson, whereas the Chair’s role
is to lead, and be the spokesperson for, the director group that
oversees the management group.380
Legislators have also promoted legislation to separate
the CEO and Chair positions.381 In Congress, Senators Charles
Schumer and Maria Cantwell introduced the Shareholder Bill
of Rights Act of 2009, and Representative Gary Peters
introduced the Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009; both
bills contain a provision requiring public companies to have an
independent board chair.382 On the state front, the North
374
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Dakota legislature in 2007 successfully added a corporate
governance chapter to the state’s business corporation statute;
one of the governance provisions prohibits the board chair from
serving as an executive officer of the corporation.383 The North
Dakota corporate governance chapter was adopted “to
strengthen corporate democracy and improve the performance
of publicly traded corporations,” and the chapter provides an
“opt-in” mechanism in which corporations may elect to be
subject to the governance rules of the chapter.384
In sum, various stakeholder groups have long advocated
for separation of the CEO and Chair positions. In the past
decade, revelation of accounting and financial manipulation by
chief executives at prominent companies, stock option
backdating by senior management at hundreds of major
corporations, and excessive risk taking by top executives at
financial and investment institutions may have fueled the
strong support among shareholders, business leaders, industry
groups, corporate governance advisers, regulators, and
legislators for more vigorous oversight of the company’s CEO
by a separate and independent board Chair.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, as
reflected in financial and nonfinancial metrics, weigh strongly
in favor of a leadership structure that separates the CEO and
Chair positions. Having a nonexecutive Chair, instead of a dual
CEO-Chair, provides a governance framework that is better
suited to the fulfillment of the board’s fundamental
responsibilities to oversee business operations and monitor
management conduct for the purpose of enhancing shareholder
value. Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates not only that
duality correlates with lower board performance and
shareholder value, but also that the negative effects of duality
cannot be eliminated simply by putting more outside directors
on the board or by installing a lead director.
The recognition that board performance and corporate
success do not depend solely on whether the positions of CEO
and Chair are held by one or two individuals does not preclude
383
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the conclusion that the nonexecutive Chair structure is better
than the duality CEO-Chair structure for fulfilling directorial
responsibility and enhancing shareholder value. Not every
company that combines the CEO and Chair positions is a
governance failure, and not every company that separates the
CEO and Chair positions is a model of good governance. It
should be noted, however, that a substantial majority of the
companies that were at the heart of the recent economic
meltdown had a combined CEO-Chair structure before the
crisis erupted.385 As these financial institutions struggled over
the past couple of years, many have voluntarily changed their
leadership structure by electing a nonexecutive Chair.386 Thus,
although many variables affect the board’s ability to perform
its management and monitoring functions and the
corporation’s ability to generate shareholder value, both
conceptual reasons and empirical evidence point to duality as a
governance variable that is correlated with lower board
performance and poorer corporate financial health. So, while
there is no guarantee that separating the leadership positions
alone will result in an effective board or strong financial
results, splitting the roles will give the company a better
chance of achieving vigilant board oversight and corporate
financial success.
The lack of guarantee that separating the roles will
bring governance and financial benefit to all companies
suggests that perhaps this split leadership structure should not
be imposed on all companies. In smaller, private companies
where the CEO and Chair is the majority shareholder, or
where there are controlling shareholders, there is effectively no
separation of control and ownership, and the potential agency
cost is minimal. Separation of the executive and board
leadership roles in such companies is unlikely to enhance board
performance or advance shareholder interests. Thus, the
conclusion that companies should separate their CEO and
Chair positions is reserved for larger, public companies.
A thorough analysis of which, if any, regulatory bodies
or other institutions should be charged with implementing and
enforcing the nonexecutive Chair structure is beyond the scope
of this article. Only a few thoughts about this question are
presented here for potential further discussion elsewhere. If we
385
386
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are to move beyond the current system where companies are
permitted to choose the leadership structure that they want,
there are various potential approaches to enforcing a
separation of the CEO and Chair positions. State legislatures
are generally regarded as the primary source of rules on
corporate governance,387 and they may establish the
nonexecutive Chair requirement in the states’ corporate
statutes. Implementing the desired leadership structure
through state statutes, though, is unlikely to be achieved easily
or quickly, and the task may be more quickly accomplished and
uniformly applied through federal laws or stock market listing
standards.388 As discussed elsewhere in this article, many
countries around the world have rules that prohibit
corporations from having one individual hold both jobs of CEO
and board Chair. Slightly different from the strict requirement
of independent board leadership is the “comply or explain”
system that exists in the United Kingdom and Canada.389 The
nonexecutive Chair structure is not a novel or untested model
of corporate leadership, and the evidence and analysis
presented in this article suggest that we make independent
board leadership the default corporate governance structure in
the United States.
There are limits to what the proposed structural change
in corporate leadership can accomplish.390 Understanding the
limitation, however, does not diminish the significance of the
benefits that this change may bring. Concentrating executive
and board leadership in one person magnifies the opportunity
for abuse; dispersing these powers reduces the potential for
such behavior. Separating the CEO and Chair positions also
signals the board’s recognition and willingness to exercise its
monitoring responsibilities. Even if such a signal is more
symbolic than real, adopting the nonexecutive Chair structure
387
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may be a highly effective way for the company to recognize the
stakeholders’ voices. In light of the ample evidence that duality
correlates with lower financial performance, acceding to the
stakeholders’ call to separate the roles may soothe the anger
being voiced against corporate leaders—even if it will not
restore the financial loss that the investing public has suffered.
Thus, although splitting the CEO and Chair positions is no
panacea for the corporate ailments with which we have become
familiar, it would not be a meaningless exercise. It would
increase the odds of getting the best from the board and the
management, both of which are entrusted with creating real
economic value and achieving optimal business performance.

